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ABSTRACT
The production decisions of the firm are important to understand aggregate eco-
nomic fluctuations. The firm’s dynamic choices, inventories or unfilled orders, hold
valuable information about the firms intertemporal optimization problem that is rele-
vant when studying the business cycle. In this research, I use aggregate and firm-level
data on these variables, along with suitable theoretical frameworks, to study three
different macroeconomic questions of current relevance.
x
Chapter I
Introduction
The producers’ choices of inventories and unfilled orders contain valuable information
on the firm’s intertemporal problem. In many cases, the study of these choices allows
us a clearer understanding of the mechanisms behind economic fluctuations. In this
research, I use aggregate and firm-level data on these variables, along with suitable
theoretical frameworks, to study three different macroeconomic questions of current
relevance.
First, in Chapter II, I look at the effect of financing constraints of capital goods
producers on aggregate investment. When a firm wishes to invest, it puts in an order
with a capital goods producer. The latter manages the time to fulfill the order in or-
der to maximize its profits. In times when this lag is big, there will be a gap between
investment demand, the orders, and the actual change in the stock of productive
capital. I show empirically that capital producers that face financing constraints take
longer to deliver capital goods. Further, in downturns, when financing conditions
are tighter, the average time to deliver is larger and increasing. Using a standard
DSGE model augmented with the capital goods producer problem and working cap-
ital requirements, I find that this mechanism can substantially dampen the recovery
of investment following a deep recession.
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Second, in Chapter III (with Andrew D. Usher), we use data on the ratio final
goods inventories to sales, in order to estimate changes in the price markup in the
economy. There has been an important increase in market concentration in several
industries in the last 5 decades. One way of finding whether this increase has also
led to an increase in market power is to look at the change in the price markup in
this period. The consensus in the literature is that firms hold inventories in order to
facilitate sales. In this case the foregone value of missing a sale for having a low stock
will be the price markup. This means that firms should choose to hold larger stocks
in periods when the markup is high. Using this type of model, we find that the price
markup has been relatively stable and may in fact have slightly decreased.
Finally, in Chapter IV, I study the relation between inventory and capital invest-
ment in an economy in which distribution technology has improved. With better
distribution technology, firms can move from holding inventories to produce sales
to hold them to smooth the costs of production. In the former case, inventory and
capital investment are complements in the production of sales. In the latter they are
substitutes. This change in the relation between inventories and capital investment
leads to a reduction in the volatility of capital investment. This results shows promise
to explain, at least partly, the recent behavior of capital investment.
2
Chapter II
Time to Deliver: Financing Constraints of Capital
Goods Producers and Investment Dynamics
2.1 Introduction
Aggregate investment is one of the more volatile components of GDP and its dynamics
are at the core of our understanding of business cycles. Recently, the literature has
focused mostly on the investment problem of the investing firm and the households
that provide their savings. In this paper, I take a look at the role that the capital
goods producers play in determining investment dynamics. Most capital goods, as
pointed out by Belesley (1969), are produced to order, creating a lag between the
orders placed by an investing firm and the shipments realized by the capital goods
producer. This delivery lag is captured by the ratio of unfilled orders to shipments. In
capital goods production this ratio is very volatile, with a standard deviation about
four times that of GDP, and it is countercyclical, with a correlation with GDP of
−0.261. These empirical facts suggest that it is not enough to look at the behavior
1The standard deviations and correlation between GDP and the ratio of unfilled orders to ship-
ments are calculated from hp-filtered data of the natural log of GDP and the level of the ratio with
a smoothing parameter of 1600. The data on unfilled orders and shipments comes from the M3
survey of the Census Bureau and corresponds to the aggregate series for Non-defense Capital Goods
Excluding Aircraft. I describe the dataset further in the following sections and the data Appendix
A
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of investment by firms or savings by households in order to know by how much,
delivered, installed and productive capital changes through the cycle. Simply put,
the same amount of firm investment will not deliver the same change in the productive
capital stock within the same number of periods throughout the cycle.
In this paper I tackle the question of the importance of this cyclical gap between
new orders and shipments of capital goods2 by first, gathering descriptive evidence
on the behavior of shipments, new orders and unfilled orders throughout the cycle.
In particular, I find that the countercyclicality of the unfilled orders to shipments
ratio is mostly driven by state-dependent behavior of capital goods producers. When
the economy is below trend, the elasticity of unfilled orders with respect to GDP
is significantly smaller than when the economy is above trend. For shipments, the
elasticity is higher when below trend. Putting these results together, we have that, as
GDP falls, capital producers accumulate unfilled orders relative to shipments. This
is consistent with findings in Meier (2018) who shows that the ratio of unfilled orders
to shipments peaks during recessions and Nalewaik and Pinto (2014) who find that
the response of capital goods shipments to new orders is stronger in periods when
new orders are low.
To interpret the data, I use a theoretical framework in which capital producers
manage shipments in order to smooth a convex cost of production. Aggregate series
on new orders and shipments suggest this to be the case, as the volatility of shipments
is about 0.65 times that of new orders. I show that, although this cost smoothing
framework does a good job at matching different moments of the data on shipments,
new orders and unfilled orders, it is incapable of generating a countercyclical unfilled
orders to shipments ratio.
Augmenting the cost smoothing framework with a financing friction helps ratio-
2Investment in machinery and equipment accounts for roughly half of aggregate investment ac-
cording to the National Income and Product Accounts. I do not consider structures in this paper
but how this two types of capital are allocated through the cycle is part of my ongoing research
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nalize the countercyclical unfilled orders to shipments ratio. In the model firms must
borrow to raise working capital in order to pay a fraction of production costs up front.
The producer is able to pledge the unfilled orders as collateral in order to reduce the
cost of borrowing3. In periods when new orders are low, the cost of borrowing is
higher, this decreases the optimal level of shipments by both increasing the cost of
production and creating incentives for the producer to hold unfilled orders to main-
tain its ability to borrow. It is important to mention that even without the use of
unfilled orders as collateral, a producer that has to borrow to raise working capital
will face a higher cost of production during a downturn when credit conditions are
tighter.
I test the role of financing frictions by using variation in tax incentives as proxy
for exogenous changes in new orders of capital goods and firm-level balance sheet
data. In my main specification I find that the semi-elasticity of shipments to the tax
incentive can be more than half a percentage point lower for financially constrained
firms compared to their unconstrained counterparts. The opposite is true of the
semi-elasticity of unfilled orders. These results are consistent with those for the
aggregate elasticities with respect to GDP when the economy is above and below
trend, providing validation for the financing friction as the relevant mechanism.
Finally, I embed the capital goods producer problem, including the financing
friction, into an otherwise standard RBC model with real shocks to productivity in
the production of consumption goods. I assume that the capital producer gets part of
the payment for the new orders up-front and only has to borrow when this payment
is less than the amount of working capital needed. This produces an occasionally
binding constraint framework in which the capital producer only has to borrow in
3In the quantitative model of Section 2.6 unfilled orders have value as assets as they represent
producers work-in-process. Alternatively, we can think of the portion of orders that is backed by an
entry in Accounts Receivable, which can be traded as an asset. In Section 2.5 I provide evidence
that the value of unfilled orders is related with lower borrowing costs
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periods when new orders are low, matching the state-dependence behavior in the
data. I use the algorithm of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017)4 to produce a piecewise-
linear approximation to the model around a steady state that preserves the non-
linearity of the occasionally-binding constraint. The model produces hump-shaped
asymmetric responses of investment. Following a positive innovation to productivity
that increases GDP to a peak of one standard deviation, roughly 2%, the cumulative
response of investment is 9.7% smaller than the response to an equivalent negative
shock. The asymmetry in the response becomes stronger for bigger shocks. Following
a fall in GDP of 4.3%, roughly the fall in the Great Recession, the cumulative fall in
investment in the financial friction model is 67% larger than the response produced
by a standard RBC model. The peak response is of similar magnitude across the two
models however, the tail of the response in the financial friction model is fatter and
longer. The hump-shaped dynamics in the financial friction model imply that bigger
negative shocks produce slower recoveries. After the Great Recession shock it takes
16 quarters for the investment response in the financial friction model to catch-up
with the response in the standard RBC model.
Related literature
This paper contributes to five strands of literature. First is the large body of
research that studies how frictions shape the responses of aggregate investment5. I
contribute to this literature by studying the importance of frictions in capital goods
production and arriving to a mechanism that produces hump-shaped responses and
investment slumps. Notably, since Christiano et al. (2005), adjustment costs of in-
4I make use of the tools discussed in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015)
5This includes work on (1) Lumpy investment: Khan and Thomas (2008), House (2014),Winberry
(2018), Caballero and Engel (1999) and Bachmann et al. (2013), (2) Irreversibility: Bertola and
Caballero (1994), Abel and Eberly (1996) and Veracierto (2002), (3) Capital specificity: Altig et al.
(2011) and (4) financial frictions: Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) among others.
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vestment have been prominently featured in dynamic models in order to match the
responses of investment. In related work Fiori (2012) provides a micro-founded ex-
planation for hump-shaped responses of investment in a model of lumpy investment
in both capital and consumption-goods production. Recently, Ottonello (2018) shows
that accounting for capital unemployment in a search framework can rationalize both
the hump-shaped responses of investment and investment slumps.
Second, the literature that studies the dynamics of capital goods production and
their delivery lag. Some seminal work is that ofMaccini (1973) and Zarnowitz (1962).
Related to this paper, Nalewaik and Pinto (2014) show empirically that shipments
of capital goods are more responsive to new orders in periods when new orders are
low, a fact that hints at the countercyclicality of the delivery lag. In another related
study, Meier (2018) interprets the delivery lag as time-to-build capital goods and
cites this as evidence to back a framework in which supply-chain disruptions lead to
contractions. I make a contribution by providing evidence that financing frictions
are partly responsible for the behavior of shipments observed by Nalewaik and Pinto
(2014) and the countercyclical delivery lag. To my knowledge I provide the first
quantitative DSGE model with an endogenous delivery lag that arises from producers
choices.6.
Third, the literature that studies the importance of heterogeneity in financial
conditions for aggregate investment fluctuations. Here we have the work of Khan and
Thomas (2008) and Gilchrist et al. (2014) who study the effect of financial frictions
faced by the investing firm in flexible price environments. In recent workOttonello and
Winberry (2019) show the importance of financial heterogeneity for the investment
channel of monetary policy. They find that financially constrained firms invest less
than their unconstrained counterparts, giving rise to state-dependence in the response
6Kahn and Maccini (2015) use the stages of production framework of Sarte et al. (2015) to build
a partial equilibrium model that shows promise for taking it to general equilibrium.
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of aggregate investment to monetary policy. The bulk of this literature focuses on
financial frictions affecting the investing firm. The main distinguishing factor of my
work is looking at role of financial frictions for aggregate investment through the
problem of the capital goods producer. Similar to Ottonello and Winberry (2019), I
find that financial frictions lead to state-dependency, in this case of the response of
shipment of capital goods to shocks that generate new orders.
Finally, I make a small contribution to the ongoing research on the effects of
tax incentives on aggregate investment. My empirical specifications make use of the
comprehensive tax subsidy described in House and Shapiro (2008)7. They exploit
variation from bonus depreciation and their theoretical intuition on the shape of
investment demand, to estimate an elasticity of investment supply between 6 and
14 percent. Recently Zwick and Mahon (2017) exploit variation from two rounds
of bonus depreciation, together with rich firm-level data on equipment purchases, to
study heterogeneity in the responses of firms to this type of stimuli. They find that a
one percent change in stimulus leads to an increase in equipment purchases of about 14
percent, smaller firms present a stronger response and firms react more to the policy
when it generates cash flows. Finally, House et al. (2017) use the comprehensive tax
subsidy to study the effect of stimulus on capital production. They find that a one
percent increase in the stimulus raises purchases of capital goods by around 2 percent,
half of which corresponds to equipment imports. I contribute by estimating the effect
of tax incentives on shipments of capital goods. For the period spanning the life of
the Investment Tax Credit, I find that a one percent increase in the tax subsidy leads
to about 3 percent increase in capital goods shipments. I also find evidence that
financing constraints dampen this response as constrained producers have a weaker
response to the stimulus.
Roadmap
7See also the work of Goolsbee (1998)
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This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 I discuss some characteristics
of capital goods producers that are relevant for the analysis. In Section 2.3 I show
evidence of the countercyclical behavior of the unfilled orders to shipments ratio
and the state-dependency of unfilled orders and shipments. In Section 2.4 I provide
a theoretical framework to explain the findings through financing frictions while in
Section 2.5 I provide evidence of the effect of those frictions. In Section 2.6 I build and
calibrate a quantitative general equilibrium model which I use in Section 2.7 to derive
implications for aggregate investment. Section 2.8 presents concluding remarks.
2.2 Characteristics of capital goods production
In this section I describe three characteristics of capital goods producers that will play
an important role when analyzing their behavior in later sections. Capital producers
produce mainly to order, they actively manage their production schedule and they
do so in order to smooth the costs of production.
Production to order
Unfilled orders are a commitment to a future purchase/shipment. Unfilled or-
ders and final good inventories tell us something about the production scheme of a
manufacturer. Firms can be classified as
1. Production to order: the manufacturer receives a new order and manages pro-
duction/delivery to maximize profits. This system of production arises when the
produced goods require a certain degree of specificity or when it is not possible
to forecast demand to hold a stock for sale. Firms that produce to order hold
higher shares of unfilled orders and lower shares of final good inventories. This
type of production seems natural for capital goods as machinery and equipment
often require customization.
2. Production to stock: the manufacturer produces to hold a stock of final good
9
inventories according to expected demand. Unfilled orders arise from stock-
outs. These producers hold a lower share of unfilled orders an higher share of
final good inventories.
An important share of manufacturing firms hold unfilled orders. From the manu-
facturing firms in Compustat8 96.7% hold unfilled orders. Only 1.5% of capital goods
producers have zero unfilled orders while the share goes to 5.5% for other manufac-
turers. Table (2.1) gathers statistics of the shares of unfilled orders and final good
inventories for both capital goods producers and other manufacturers. In general,
capital goods producers keep a larger share of unfilled orders than other manufactur-
ers. The percentage of capital goods producers with at least two quarters9 of unfilled
orders is above 23% while it is 16% for other manufacturers. The opposite is true
for final good inventories, in general capital goods producers hold a smaller share of
them than other manufacturers. Above 67% of the capital goods producers hold more
than twice the value of their final good inventories as unfilled orders. The number
for other manufacturers is 55%.
Figure (2.1) shows the ratios of unfilled orders to shipments10 and final good inven-
tories to shipments for manufacturers within the categories of “Consumer Durables”
and “Industrial Equipment Manufacturing”11. In panel (a), producers of consumer
8I give full descriptions of the data used at firm, sector and aggregate levels in Appendix A
9Meaning that the value of their unfilled orders is larger than twice the value of their quarterly
shipments
10All references to shipments in Compustat data refer to the value of sales. One caveat of my
firm-level analysis is that the order backlog, used as unfilled orders, may contain sales backlog as well
as unfunded backlog. Making sales bigger than shipments. Meier (2018) compares the aggregate
unfilled orders to shipments ratio computed using these Compustat variables to the the ratio from
the M3 survey and finds them to be similar. This attenuates the concern of sales being different
from shipments.
11Consumer durables include all manufacturers with 4 digit NAICS codes 3352 and 3371. Indus-
trial equipment manufacturing includes producers within the 3332 NAICS code category.
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Table 2.1: Ratios of unfilled orders and final good inventories to shipments
UFO = 0 UFO
end
Ship
≥ 2 UFOend
FGI
≥ 2
Capital goods 1.5% 23% 67%
Other manufacturing 5.5% 17% 56%
Total 3.3% 20% 63%
Notes:UFO represents the value of the order backlog at the end of the year. Ship is
the value of annual sales divided by four. FGI are final good inventories at the end
of the year. The classification into “Capital Goods” is done through NAICS codes
according to BEA categories for private investment by type. Data is annual for the
period between 1974 and 2018. All variables are taken from Compustat and
converted to real terms. Description of the breakdown in categories and deflators
used is given in Appendix A
durables have mainly low unfilled orders with most of them bunched under a ratio of
1. Their ratio of final good inventories to shipments mostly spans the range between
zero and 1. In panel (b) for industrial equipment producers, the ratio of unfilled orders
is much higher, spanning the range from zero to 4 while the share of final good inven-
tories looks a little lower than that of the consumer durables manufacturers. These
are the patterns discussed for a production to stock sector, Consumer Durables and
a production to order one, Industrial Equipment.
Figure (2.3) shows a the correlation between several lags and leads of the unfilled
orders to shipments ratio and contemporaneous GDP in a correlogram. In panel (a)
the ratio for consumer durables has a strong contemporaneous correlation with GDP.
This reflect stock-outs in periods of high demand, when the producer runs-out the
available inventory and takes in new orders. In panel (b), Capital Goods do not
present the same correlation pattern from the “production to stock scheme”. Instead
we see an S-shaped curve in which the ratio of unfilled orders to shipments lags the
cycle considerably. Further, the ratio is countercyclical contemporaneously. I will
explain the lagged pattern in the correlation below as evidence that the capital goods
producers use unfilled orders to smooth the cost of production. The countercyclicality
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Figure 2.1: Unfilled orders (x-axis) vs Final good inventories (y-axis), ratios to ship-
ments
(a) Consumer durables
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Notes: Each point on the scatter-plots represents the ratio for a firm-year pair for
the period between 1974 and 2018. Ratios calculated from Compustat data deflated
as discussed in Appendix A. The ratios of unfilled orders to shipments are trimmed
at the 1st and 99th percentiles of all firms. The industries included in each of these
categories are as discussed on the footnote.
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of the ratio is addressed in Section 2.4 when I introduce financial frictions.
Figure 2.2: Correlation between the UFOend
Ship
in t + j and the cyclical component of
GDP in t
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Notes: Correlation between HP-filtered log-GDP and 7 leads and lags of HP-filtered
ratio of unfilled orders to shipments. The smoothing parameter is 1600. All
variables are in real terms.
Production schedule
The ratio of unfilled orders to shipments is volatile and cyclical. An important
share of this variability comes from within firm variation, meaning that capital goods
producers change their production schedule through time. The adjusted R-square of a
firm-level and year-level fixed effects model on the capital producers unfilled orders to
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shipments ratio is 64%. This is the share of the variation in the ratio that is explained
by variation across firms. The remaining 36% comes from variation captured by firm-
time level observables or unobservables. This is the share of the variation in ratio
that is attributable to changes from the capital goods producer problem through the
cycle.12
Cost smoothing
The accounting relation between unfilled orders at the end of the period UFO,
new orders NO and shipments Ship is given by
∆UFOt = NOt − Shipt (2.1)
Consider this thought experiment. A producer smooths the costs of production
given the deterministic process for new orders shown by the top graph of Figure
(2.3). Optimally, the producer sets constant shipments, shown by the straight line.
Using equation (2.1) we can trace the unfilled orders curve as shown at the bottom of
figure (2.3). This is the same wave as new orders lagged by a period. The correlation
between new orders at time t and leads and lags of unfilled orders will be the highest at
t+j and lowest and negative at t−j will have the lowest and negative correlation with
NOt. For the periods between t−j and t+j the S-shape of unfilled orders implies that
the correlogram will between NO and UFO will be S-shaped, just like that in panel
(b) of Figure (2.3). Shipments are constant, so this is also the correlogram between
NO and the unfilled orders to shipments ratio. From this thought experiment, I
conclude that the S-pattern correlogram in Figure (2.3) can be explained by the
capital producers using unfilled orders in order to smooth the costs of production.
Now, from equation (2.1) if follows that unfilled orders smooth out shipments
12I find some evidence of cyclical composition effects in Compustat. These explain part of the
64% of across firm variation. I am currently studying this subject in the scope of a separate project
but provide a short description of the composition evidence in Appendix A.
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Figure 2.3: Cost smoothing under deterministic new orders
Ship
NO
∆UFO
UFO
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t
t+ j
t− j
Notes: Thought experiment: new orders are assumed deterministic and follow a
sinusoidal wave. Optimally, the producer chooses a constant level of shipments and
the resulting unfilled orders follow a sinusoidal wave shifted by one quarter of the
cycle of the wave.
relative to new orders if ∆UFO is procyclical. Figure (2.4) shows on panel (a) the
time series of the cyclical components of shipments and new orders. Shipments are
smoother than new orders. They are below new orders when new orders peak and
above them when new orders fall. Panel (b) shows the cyclical component of ∆UFO
along with recession bars. The series is procyclical giving evidence of cost smoothing
in capital production.
2.3 New orders, unfilled orders and shipments through
the cycle
Descriptive analysis
Three components determine the behavior of aggregate investment from the perspec-
tive of capital goods production: new orders, unfilled orders and shipments. Table
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Figure 2.4: Cyclicality of shipments and orders
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Notes: panel (a): Cyclical component of shipments and new orders of capital goods
obtain with an HP-filter of the variables in logs, with smoothing parameter 1600.
panel (b) Period-on-period change in the value of unfilled orders. All data is in real
terms and corresponds to the category “Non-defense equipment excluding aircraft”
from the M3 survey
(2.2) presents statistics of these variables in the business cycle. As aggregate in-
vestment, the three variables are procyclical, persistent and volatile, with standard
deviations more than three times that of GDP. Notably, the correlation with GDP
is lower than that of aggregate investment13 for all the variables. The fourth column
of the table presents the statistics for the ratio of unfilled orders to shipments. The
ratio is countercyclical, with a correlation with GDP of -0.26, persistent and volatile.
Figure (2.5) shows on panel (a) the hp-filtered ratio of unfilled orders to shipments
alongside the cyclical component of GDP for the period between 1968 and 2018.
Consistent with the correlogram of Figure (2.5) the ratio seems to lag the cycle by
about 5 to 6 periods. Panel (b) shows the ratio in levels for the same period. It
presents a steep downward trend from the late seventies to the late nineties, a decline
13The correlation between aggregate investment and GDP for the post-war period is
Corr(GDP, I) = 0.83 according to data from the NIPA tables
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Table 2.2: Components of investment through the cycle
NOt Shipt UFOt
UFOt
Shipt
corr(x,GDP ) 0.76 0.66 0.36 -0.26
corr(xt, xt−1) 0.80 0.91 0.94 0.91
σx
σGDP
5.64 3.69 5.03 4.13
Notes: Computed from deflated M3 survey data for the category of “Non-defense
equipment excluding aircraft”
that coincides with the introduction of “just in time manufacturing” to the west. The
cyclical behavior of the ratio is obscured by the strong trend however, it is noticeable
that it increases at the end of expansions and peaks well into recessions14.
To explore this feature of the ratio, I compute correlations and elasticities of
the variables, conditioning on whether the economy is above or below its trend15.
The results, on Table (2.3) show some evidence of state-dependence, particularly for
unfilled orders and their ratio with respect to shipments. The elasticity of the former
with respect to GDP is almost three times bigger when the economy is above trend
than when it is below. Similarly, the correlation of unfilled orders with GDP is higher
above trend by the same factor of three. The ratio of unfilled orders to shipments turns
to be almost acyclical when the economy is above trend and countercyclical when the
economy is below. The elasticity of shipments with respect to GDP is slightly higher
when below trend but not by a factor comparable to the state-dependence of unfilled
orders.
In summary, capital goods producers manage unfilled orders in order to smooth
the cost of production. The resulting delivery lag is captured by an unfilled orders to
shipments ratio that is countercyclical. This feature of the delivery lag appears to be
driven by the behavior of unfilled orders and, to an extent, shipments during periods
14With the exception of the second part of the double-dip recession in 1981.
15I consider the economy to be below trend if HP-filtered log-GDP is negative. Positive values
indicate the economy is above trend
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Figure 2.5: The unfilled orders to shipments ratio through the cycle
(a) HP-detrended UFO/Ship ratio and GDP
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Notes:panel(a): HP-filtered ratio of unfilled orders over shipments for “Non-defense
equipment excluding aircraft” from the M3 survey and HP-filtered log-GDP from
NIPA tables. Panel (b) Levels of the ratio of unfilled orders to shipments of the above
mentioned data. Recession bands correspond to the NBER recession classification
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Table 2.3: State-dependent elasticities with respect to GDP
NOt Shipt UFOt
UFOt
Shipt
Above Below Above Below Above Below Above Below
corr(x,GDP ) 0.58 0.66 0.41 0.42 0.25 0.08 -0.05 -0.34
∂ln(xt)
∂ln(GDPt)
2.93 3.85 1.74 2.5 3.01 1.19 -0.57 -1.95
Notes: Measures of above and below trend correspond to the sign of HP-filtered
log-GDP. For new orders, shipments and unfilled orders calculations are done on
HP-filtered log-values. Calculations with the ratio are done with HP-filtered levels.
All variables correspond to “Non-defense equipment excluding aircraft” from the M3
survey
when the economy is below trend.
Theoretical analysis
Lets analyze the descriptive results using a cost-smoothing framework. Consider the
problem of a producer of capital goods that faces a convex cost of production. Each
period, the producer takes as given the market price Pt and new orders for capital
goods NOt = NO(Pt) which go into the stock of unfilled orders according to
UFObt = UFO
b
t−1 − Shipt−1 +NOt (2.2)
UFOt = UFO
b
t − Shipt (2.3)
The stock UFOb corresponds to the unfilled orders at the beginning of the pe-
riod, before production and shipments. It differs from the data object of the descrip-
tive analysis, unfilled orders at the end of the period UFOt. These two are related
through equation 2.3. The producer chooses a level of shipments Shipt at a cost
C(Shipt),
∂2C(Ship)
∂Ship2
≥ 0 and receives per unit payment of Pt. Shipments in the period
are constrained by the stock of unfilled orders.
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Shipt ≤ UFObt (2.4)
The producers problem satisfies the Bellman equation
V (UFO,P ) = max
UFO′
Ship ≤ UFOb
{PShipt − C(Ship) + βE [V (UFO′, P ′)]} (2.5)
subject to the law of motion (2.2). Let µ(UFO,P ) = ∂V (UFO,P )
∂UFO
, the shadow price
of an unfilled order and pit the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on constraint (2.4).
The first order necessary conditions are
µt = Pt − C ′(Shipt) (2.6)
pit = µt − βE[µt+1] (2.7)
pit(UFOt − Shipt) = 0 (2.8)
Proposition 1. The shadow price of unfilled orders µt is decreasing when the unfilled
orders to shipments ratio is increasing.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Corollary 1. Away from the constraint Ship(UFO,P ) approaches a concave function
S(P ), such that C ′′(S(P ))S ′(P ) = 1
Proposition (1) ties the cyclicality of the unfilled orders to shipments ratio to
that of the shadow price µ, which from equation (2.6), is equal to the price markup.
If C ′(Ship(UFO,P )) is convex in prices, then µ decreases with P and the unfilled
orders to shipments ratio is procyclical. If C ′(Ship(UFO,P )) is concave in prices,
the opposite will be true. To discuss the shape of the policy function Ship(UFO,P )
I have yet to establish properties for NO(P ).
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Figure (2.6) shows, for given UFO, the value of the constraint UFOb (dashed
line), the policy function for shipments Ship(UFO,P ) (solid line) and the level of new
orders NO(P ) (dotted line) for the cases when ∂2NO(P )
∂P 2
> 0 (panel a) and ∂2NO(P )
∂P 2
< 0
(panel b). From equation (2.2) we have that end-of-period unfilled orders accumulate,
∆UFO > 0, whenever NO > Ship. In panel (a), with convex NO(P ), this happens
when new orders are high, as is the case in the data (see Figure (2.4)). The opposite
is true when NO(P ) is a concave as shown on panel (b).
Ship(UFO,P ) approaches the concavity (convexity) of new orders as it approaches
the constraint. Making Ship(UFO,P ) less concave (convex) than new orders. This
creates the pattern of accumulation of unfilled orders that we see in Figure (2.6).
This rules-out concave functional forms for new orders as they generate countercycli-
cal accumulation of unfilled orders.
Proposition 2. If NO(P ) is convex then marginal cost C ′(Ship(P )) is convex
Proof. Follows from Corollary 1. See Appendix B
From Proposition 2 it follows that µ(P,UFO) is countercyclical which implies
from Proposition 1 that the unfilled orders to shipments ratio is procyclical.
Table (2.4) shows simulated moments from a calibration of the model under the
assumption of quadratic cost of shipments and quadratic new orders in prices. I
refer to this as the Baseline (partial equilibrium) specification. Targeted moments
are marked with boxes. The functional forms are
C(Ship) =
b
2
Ship2 , NO(P ) =
a
2
P 2
ln(Pt) = ρln(Pt−1) + εt
With εt i.i.d. innovations from a Normal distribution with mean zero and standard
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Figure 2.6: Shipments, policy function
(a) Convex new orders
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(b) Concave new orders
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Notes: Generated using the policy function from a global solution method assuming
quadratic cost of shipments. Panel(a) New orders are assumed to be quadratic in
prices. Panel(b) New orders are proportional to the square root of prices
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deviation calibrated to match the standard deviation of new orders16. The persistence
of prices, ρ is calibrated to match the persistence on new orders. Parameters a and
b target Corr(∆UFOt, NOt) = 0.73 and σShip/σNO, respectively. The model does a
relatively good job at matching untargeted moments, generating persistent unfilled
orders, shipments and delivery lags. The two prominent exceptions are the cyclicality
and volatility of the delivery lag. As expected from the theoretical analysis, the
model produces a procyclical delivery lag. Further, it is three times as volatile as new
orders.17.
The results of this section point towards an additional mechanism, different from
cost smoothing, to rationalize the cyclicality of the unfilled orders to shipments ratio.
A key factor is the cyclcicality of the shadow price of unfilled orders. In the current
setup, the shadow price of an unfilled order is the price markup, as the firm gives up
a shipment to accumulate unfilled orders. This generates a countercyclical shadow
price of unfilled orders as markups in this setup are countercyclical. It is relatively
more costly for the producer to accumulate unfilled orders during downturns, when
markups are high, leading to the countercyclical ratio. A mechanism that increases
the value of an unfilled order during downturns is a candidate to explain the cyclicality
of the ratio. In the following section, I make an argument for a financing friction that
gives value to unfilled orders as collateral.
16Moments from NO, UFO and Ship are computed from HP-filtered log-variables. Moments for
the ratio of unfilled orders to shipments are computed from the HP-filtered ratio in levels
17This implies a ratio of unfilled orders to shipments fifteen times as volatile as GDP
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Table 2.4: Moments from the data and the partial equilibrium model
New orders NO
Data Model
Corr(NOt, NOt−1) 0.85 0.88
σNO 0.08 0.08
End-of-Period UFOend
Data Model
Corr(NO,UFOend) 0.36 0.48
Corr(UFOendt , UFO
end
t−1) 0.94 0.99
σUFOend/σNO 0.88 0.52
Shipments Ship
Data Model
Corr(NO,Ship) 0.66 0.96
Corr(Shipt, Shipt−1) 0.91 0.90
σShip/σNO 0.65 0.68
Delivery lag dlag
Data Model
Corr(NO,Rat) -0.26 0.27
Corr(Ratt, Ratt−1) 0.91 0.98
σRat/σNO 0.73 3.28
Notes: Moments generated from HP-filtered data from the M3 survey. Model
moments correspond to HP-filtered data simulated for one thousand periods after
discarding a 150 periods burn-in. Simulations use a policy function obtained from a
global solution method
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2.4 A model of capital goods producers with fi-
nancing constraints
Assume that the capital goods producer from the previous section faces a working
capital constraint18. Every period the producer must borrow funds in order to pay
a fraction κ of the cost of production up-front. The loan is paid back, together with
a borrowing cost at the end of the period. I assume that the producer can pledge
unfilled orders as some form of collateral, making the borrowing cost a decreasing
function, R(UFO) of unfilled orders.19 The first order conditions are
µt = Pt − C ′(Shipt) + κ(−R′(UFOt)C(Shipt)− C ′(Shipt)R(UFOt)) (2.9)
µt = pit + βE[µt+1]− κC(Shipt)R′(UFOt) (2.10)
Away from the constraint µt approaches −κR′(UFOt)C(Shipt) ≥ 0. I further
assume that R′′(UFO) > 0 so that µt is decreasing in UFOt and increasing in Shipt,
making µ decreasing as the unfilled orders to shipments ratio increases. Through the
financing friction, R(UFO) gives unfilled orders an additional value. When shipments
are low, increasing unfilled orders is costly because of the high markup. However,
decreasing unfilled orders is also costly, as it increases the shadow price through
−R′(UFOt)C(Shipt). The producer faces an additional tradeoff when reducing un-
filled orders, it gains the price markup but increases its borrowing costs.
18My setup for a working capital constraint is based on the work of Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
and Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
19In this section I make make R a function of only UFO for exposition purposes. I explore a
different specification including the amount borrowed in quantitative model in Section 2.6.
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Figure (2.7) shows the policy functions for Ship(UFO,P ) and µ(UFO,P ) under
the Baseline calibration for different values of κ. I assume a functional form for the
borrowing cost given by R(UFO) = ξUFOζ . I calibrate the value of zeta to −0.06
given estimates from the firm-level dataset. I discuss this estimation in in Section
(2.4). The value of ξ is calibrated so that, on average, the cost of borrowing is 4%
at an annual rate, the average financing cost in my dataset. In panel (a), as the
firm has to borrow a larger share of the production costs, the policy function for
shipments flattens. The producer reduces its unfilled orders by less when prices are
low and increases them by more when prices are high. On panel (b), the shadow
price of unfilled orders µ(UFO,P ) turns from decreasing in prices to increasing as
κ increases. As argued, a procyclical shadow price implies a countercyclical unfilled
orders to shipments ratio.
Table (2.5) shows the estimated moments a calibration of the model with financial
friction. I call this Friction specification. I target the cyclicality of the unfilled orders
to shipments ratio to calibrate κ. The calibrated model produces shipments with a
standard deviation 0.80 times that of new orders20. This implies shipments are four
times as volatile as GDP which is still within the range considered for investment.
The model does a little worst than the baseline in generating volatile unfilled orders.
Finally, the Friction model does a much better job matching the volatility of the
unfilled orders to shipments ratio at 0.62 times that of new orders or about three
times the volatility of GDP.
In general, the model does a good job of matching targeted and untargeted mo-
ments. It manages to produce a countercyclical unfilled orders to shipments ratio
with the volatility that we see in the data. This shows that the financing friction
mechanism can rationalize the behavior of the ratio within an otherwise standard
20Given the simplicity of the model, there is a tradeoff in the calibration exercise. Increasing the
value of κ makes the ratio more countercyclical but it also increases the volatility of shipments.
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Figure 2.7: Policy functions, given UFO, for different values of κ
(a) Ship(UFO,P )
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Notes:Generated using the policy function from a global solution method assuming
quadratic cost of shipments.
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Table 2.5: Moments from the data and the model with a financing constraint
New orders NO
Data Baseline Friction
Corr(NOt, NOt−1) 0.85 0.88 0.87
σNO 0.08 0.08 0.08
End-of-Period UFOend
Data Baseline Friction
Corr(NO,UFOend) 0.36 0.48 0.77
Corr(UFOendt , UFO
end
t−1) 0.94 0.99 0.98
σUFOend/σNO 0.88 0.52 0.29
Shipments Ship
Data Baseline Friction
Corr(NO,Ship) 0.66 0.96 0.98
Corr(Shipt, Shipt−1) 0.91 0.90 0.91
σShip/σNO 0.65 0.68 0.80
Delivery lag dlag
Data Baseline Friction
Corr(NO, dlag) -0.26 0.27 −0.26
Corr(dlagt, dlagt−1) 0.91 0.98 0.79
σdlag/σNO 0.73 3.28 0.62
Notes: Moments generated from HP-filtered data from the M3 survey. Model
moments correspond to HP-filtered data simulated for one thousand periods after
discarding a 150 periods burn-in. Simulations use a policy function obtained from a
global solution method
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cost-smoothing framework. In the following section I provide empirical results to
build a story on how financing constraints affect the production of capital goods.
2.5 The role of financing constraints in capital goods
production
In this section I provide evidence in favor of the financing constraint mechanism.
There are three parts to this section, first, evidence of credit conditions tightening
during downfalls. Second, evidence of heterogeneous responses of capital producers
according to their financing conditions. Third, evidence on the effect of unfilled orders
on the borrowing costs.
Cyclicality of credit conditions
Figure (2.8) presents data from the Senior Loan Officers Opinion Survey conducted
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The responses in both
panels correspond to conditions for commercial and industrial loans to medium and
large firms. Panel (a) shows through time, the percentage of respondents that re-
ported tightening credit standards minus the percentage that reported loosening
them. When this number is positive, more respondents are tightening credit con-
ditions. When negative more respondents are loosening them. For example, the mid
2000’s correspond to a period of loose credit conditions leading up to the financial
crisis, when credit conditions severely tightened. Panel (b) shows the percentage of
respondents that reported increasing credit spreads minus the percentage of those
who reported decreasing spreads. For both questions there is a clear cyclical pattern
with peaks in recessions, making credit conditions tighter during downturns.
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Figure 2.8: Conditions on commercial and industrial credit to medium and large firms
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Notes: Data from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Data corresponds to responses about
commercial and industrial loans for medium and large firms. Panel (a): percentage
of respondents that report tightening credit standards minus percentage that reported
loosening them. Panel (b): percentage of respondents that reported increasing credit
spreads minus percentage that reported lowering them
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2.5.1 Firm-level responses
I use balance sheet data from Compustat to construct two firm-level variables to work
as proxy for financial hardship21. The leverage-ratio defined as total debt to assets
and, financing costs constructed as the ratio of expenses related to credit to total
debt. Table (2.6) shows some summary statistics of these variables. The average
leverage-ratio in the dataset is 23% with a standard deviation of 20%. The average
financing cost, reported at annual rates, is 4.4%22. The financing cost one standard
deviation above from the mean is roughly 8%. At the 95th percentile the value is
almost 14%.23.
Table 2.6: Summary statistics of financial variables
Mean Median SD p95
Leverage 0.226 0.199 0.191 0.652
Financing cost 0.044 0.039 0.036 0.138
Notes: Values computed with firm-level data from Compustat for manufacturing
firms classified as capital goods producers according to BEA definitions of
investment by type, see Appendix A. The period used is 1974 to 2018. All variables
are in real terms.
I use lagged values of these variables to measure financial hardship and divide
firms into quartiles according to them. Let Qq,F init = 1 if firm i belongs to the qth
quartile in period t according to measure Fin. My empirical specification is given by
yit = δi + δt + β
ζ
4ζ
m
t +
3∑
q=1
βζqQ
q,F in
it ζ
m
t + γ
Fin
4 Finit−1 + Controlsit + εit (2.11)
21Appendix A has a description of the dataset and further details on the construction of variables
22consistent with the calibration I used in the model of Section 2.4
23The calibration of the discount factor β = 0.99 implies a steady state risk free annual rate of
4%.
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where yit ∈ {ln(Shipit), ln(UFOit)} and Finit ∈ {Levit−1, rit−1}. More precisely,
I use demeaned versions of the financial variables (Finit−1−E[Finis]), to ensure that
the responses are identified through within-firm variation, following Ottonello and
Winberry (2019). The covariate ζm is a proxy for an exogenous shock to new orders
at the type of capital m level.
The heterogeneity of the response across quartiles is captured by the coefficients
βq. When βq ̸= 0 the response of firms within quartile q differs from the response of
firms in the top quartile, the most financially constrained, which serves as control. A
value of βq > 0 implies a stronger response for firms in quartile q compared to the
control. The total response of a firm in quartile q is given by βq + β4.
For the value of ζ I use the comprehensive tax subsidy described in House and
Shapiro (2008) and House et al. (2017). The formula to construct ζ is
ζmt = ITC
m
t + τ
pi
t Z
m
t
where ITCmt is the value of the Investment Tax Credit for capital of type m. Zmt
are depreciation allowances for capital of typem and τpi is the corporate tax rate. The
comprehensive tax subsidy works as a proxy for unfilled orders, House et al. (2017)
find semi-elasticities of capital goods purchases with respect to the comprehensive tax
subsidy of about 2% using the period between 1974 and 2009. I restrict the sample for
my estimation to 1978-1990 for a few of reasons. First, this period includes the full and
permanent repeal of the ITC, providing strong variation in zeta. Second, the different
legislation acts that change the levels of the ITC (and ζ) in the period, are classified
as tax changes for exogenous reasons to the cycle in Romer and Romer (2010). Third,
House et al. (2017) find that for the response of 2% on investment estimated in the
full period half corresponds to purchases of imported goods. Additionally, they find
that the share of imports of capital goods has steadily risen through time, allowing
to conjecture a weaker response of U.S. capital producers to changes in tax incentives
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in later periods, for example, the rounds of Bonus Depreciation24.
Figure (2.9) shows the levels of the comprehensive tax subsidy by type of capital
25. There is variation across different types of capital, with differences as large as
about five percentage points, and substantial variation through time. Particularly,
the drop from the repeal of the ITC is the dominant change in the series.
Figure 2.9: Comprehensive tax subsidy
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Notes: Data on the comprehensive tax subsidy from House et al. (2017) provided by
Christopher House. The period considered corresponds to part of the lifespan of the
Investment Tax Credit
The first two columns of Table (2.7) shows the results of estimating equation
(2.11) on the firm level data using the leverage-ratio to sort the firms into quartiles.
Firms at the top quartile, the control, are the most financially constrained. The
semi-elasticity of shipments to the tax incentive is 3.3% for this group. The estimate
24Using the entire period with a specification without the financial constraint variables, I find
responses to the tax incentives that are not significantly different from zero. As my goal is to study
the heterogeneous response rather than the effect of the stimulus, I choose the period for which there
is a stronger response
25The classification by type of capital and matching between Compustat and the comprehensive
tax subsidy data is discussed in Appendix A
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is higher than the result on purchases of capital goods found in House et al. (2017).
Moving to the top middle quartile, the response is not significantly different from
that of the control group. The bottom middle quartile however, is significantly larger
both in statistical and economical sense. A 1% increase in the tax incentive causes
a 3.9% increase in shipments for unconstrained firms. Firms in all other quartiles
respond more modestly with a 3.3% increase in shipments. Similarly, a 1% increase
in the tax incentive, increases unfilled orders for constrained firms by 3.2% while for
the unconstrained firms in the bottom middle quartile, unfilled orders only increases
2.6%. The semi-elasticity of the unfilled orders to shipments ratio is given by
∂log(UFOt/Shipt)
∂ζ
=
∂log(UFOt)
∂ζ
− ∂log(Shipt)
∂ζ
The elasticity of the ratio is −0.13% for the constrained firms but −1.36 for
producers in the bottom middle quartile. Conditional on a positive new order, un-
constrained firms will lower their delivery lag by much more. This provides evidence
of the role of the financing constraint mechanism in the cyclical behavior of ship-
ments and unfilled orders. In downturns, when firms are financially constrained they
respond to a new order by accumulating more unfilled orders relative to shipments
than they would during an expansion, when credit conditions are more slack, leading
to an increasing ratio of unfilled orders to shipments.
As a check, the last two columns of Table (2.7) show the results of estimating
equation (2.11) using financing costs to sort firms into quartiles. As before, the top
quartile is the most constrained and my control group. The magnitude of the re-
sponses is similar to the previous results. A 1% increase in tax incentives leads to a
3.75% increase of shipments for the more constrained firms. In the middle quartiles,
where firms are unconstrained, the shipments response is significantly higher in sta-
tistical and economical sense. These unconstrained firms increase their shipments by
4.14% consistent with my previous results.
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Table 2.7: Estimated responses to a 1% change in tax incentives
Quartiles by leverage-ratio Quartiles by financing cost
ln(Ship) ln(UFO) ln(Ship) ln(UFO)
Q1 3.547 2.867 3.621 3.516
diff −Q4 0.206 -0.340 -0.126 -0.190
(0.213) (0.145) (0.219) (0.102)
Q2 3.957 2.607 4.147 3.597
diff −Q4 0.616 -0.600 0.400 -0.109
(0.218) (0.392) (0.209) (0.087)
Q3 3.277 3.045 4.138 3.660
diff −Q4 -0.064 -0.162 0.391 -0.046
(0.190) (0.346) (0.163) (0.063)
Q4 3.341 3.207 3.747 3.706
(1.603) (1.759) (1.647) (1.751)
N 4283 4283 4283 4283
Notes:
yit = δi + δt + β
ζ
4ζ
m
t +
3∑
q=1
βζqQ
q,F in
it ζ
m
t + γ
Fin
4 Finit−1 + Controlsit + εit
Estimated using firm-level data from Compustat matched with data on the
Comprehensive tax subsidy from House et al. (2017). Fin represents either the
demeaned leverage-ratio or demeaned financing cost, both variables winsorized at the
first and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered26 at the firm and type of
capital-year level27 . Appendix A provides details on the merging process. Controls
include value of assets (in logs), firm age, employment level (in logs) and Lerner
index
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Unfilled orders and borrowing cost
The borrowing cost I have proposed is a decreasing function of unfilled orders. My
argument here is that unfilled orders hold value as an asset either because they are
backed by accounts receivable or because the firm accumulates work-in-process with
each new order. The latter is a feature that I include in the general equilibrium model
of Section 2.6. I estimate the elasticities of the financing cost with respect to unfilled
orders and total debt, according to the following specification.
ln(rit) = δi + δt + ζ1ln(UFO
end
it ) + ζ2ln(Debt
end
it ) + Controlsit + εit (2.12)
Table (2.8) shows the estimated coefficients from equation (2.12). Both elasticities
are statistically significant. The elasticity with respect to unfilled orders, although
small, may be economically significant. Given an average financing cost of 4% at an
annual rate the decrease in financing costs following a 1% increase in unfilled orders
drops the financing costs by a quarter of a percentage point at an annual rate.
Table 2.8: Elasticities of financing costs to unfilled orders and total debt
(1)
l_fincost
log(UFO) -0.06
(0.009)
log(Debt) 0.31
(0.003)
N 15804
Notes:
ln(rit) = δi + δt + ζ1ln(UFO
end
it ) + ζ2ln(Debt
end
it ) + Controlsit + εit
Estimated using firm-level data from Compustat as described in Appendix A. The
financing cost corresponds to the demeaned variable winsorized at the first and 99th
percentile. Errors are clustered at the firm and year level. Controls include value of
assets (in logs), firm age, employment level (in logs) and Lerner index
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2.6 A business cycle model with capital goods pro-
ducers
In this section I embed the problem of the capital goods producer with a financial
constraint into an otherwise standard business cycle model. First I will describe
some details about the pricing of new orders and shipments, then the capital goods
producer’s problem and finally the rest of the economy.
The aggregate stock of beginning-of-period unfilled orders evolves according to
UFObt = UFO
b
t−1 − Shipt−1 +NOt (2.13)
Shipments at time t are priced at the average price of the stock of unfilled orders,
P¯t. The assumption here is that each firm ships an equal proportion of the unfilled
orders it has. At the moment of placing a new order the household pays a share κ1 of
its value at market price Pt and will pay the remaining share (1− κ1) at this average
price upon receiving the shipments28. The price value of the stock of unfilled orders
evolves according to
P¯tUFO
b
t = P¯t−1(UFO
b
t−1 − Shipt−1) + PtNOt (2.14)
Equation 2.14 can be written as
P¯t+1 =
(
1− dUFO
b
t
UFObt+1
)
P¯t + (Pt − P¯t) NOt
UFObt+1
(2.15)
28I make this assumption given the saliency of price-scalation clauses in contracts. However, I
reproduce the results from the model without this assumption in Appendix D. I find that none of
the results in the model analysis are driven solely or mainly by this assumption.
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Capital producer
There is a unit measure of identical capital goods producers. The representative cap-
ital goods producer takes the market price of capital goods Pt as given, has agency
on the level of new orders nokpt it accepts and decides on a production schedule to
maximize profits. The timing at which different events happen within the period is
important to describe the producer’s problem. Each period t is divided into beginning
of period t− and end of period t+.
Beginning of period (first stage) t−
In this stage, the producer receives new orders nokpt and payment for a fraction
κ1 of their market value. All orders taken in are projects which must be started
at a cost Φ(nokpt ) in units of the final good. These projects increase the stock of
beginning-of-period unfilled orders ufokpt which evolves according to
ufokpt = ufo
kp
t−1 − Shipt−1 + nokpt (2.16)
The producer purchases consumption goods It to be used as inputs to move started
projects into a production line, according to a decreasing returns technology xt =
f(It). The xt projects increase the stock of work-in-process Xt under the constraint
Xt ≤ ufokpt (2.17)
I will discuss how Xt turns into shipments and the evolution of Xt in the second
stage of the period. The producer must pay the totality of the cost of new orders
Φ(nokpt ) as well as a fraction κ2It of the production inputs using working capital given
by
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WCt = κ1Ptno
kp
t − Φ(nokpt ) +Dt
Dt ≥ 0 WCt ≥ κ2It
(2.18)
The term Dt corresponds to an intratemporal loan from financial intermediaries
which procure their funds from the households. The loan is paid back in the second
stage of the period at a cost schedule given by
Rt = R(ufo
kp
t , Dt) = ξ(ufo
kp
t )
ζ1Dζ2t , Rt ≥ 0 (2.19)
Financing costs depend positively on the amount borrowed Dt and negatively on
the unfilled orders ufokpt that can be pledged as collateral. Unfilled orders, either
started projects or work-in-process, are essential for production which gives them
value as assets. The rate Rt reflects a risk of default which I do not model explicitly
but for which I make the following two assumptions
1. The risk of default does not affect the shipments made in the period and a pro-
ducer that defaults continues operations as one more of the identical producers.
2. The expected and realized return to the households is zero. The households
lend out Dt in the first stage of the period and get Dt back in the second stage,
before consumption takes place.
Table (2.9) summarizes the transactions made in stage 1.
End of period (second stage) t+
In the second stage a fraction θ of the work-in-process turns into shipments. The
stock of work-in-process Xt evolves according to
Xt = (1− θ)Xt−1 + xt (2.20)
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Table 2.9: Producers accounting: stage 1
Working capital
κ1Ptno
kp
t
Dt
κ2It
Φ(nokpt )
Accounts payable
(1 +Rt)Dt
(1− κ2)It
Revenue
κ1Ptno
kp
t
Operation costs
RtDt
It
Φ(nokpt )
Notes: T-ledger of transactions made by the capital goods producer during the first
stage. Following standard practices, left column corresponds to debits, right to
credits. Revenue accounts are credit accounts, costs accounts are debit accounts.
The producer sends shipments and receives a fraction 1− κ1 of their value at the
average price of unfilled orders P¯t. Finally, the firm pays back the amount borrowed
Dt with the cost of borrowing RtDt29, pays the remaining fraction (1 − κ2)It of
consumption goods and makes dividend payments for the amount of the profit to the
household. Table (2.10) shows the transactions in this stage marked with boxes.
The producers problem is to maximize profits according to
max
∞∑
t=0
E
[
βtu′(Ct)(κ1Ptno
kp
t + (1− κ1)P¯tθXt − It − Φ(nokpt )−DtR(ufokpt , Dt))
]
(2.21)
subject to the laws of motion (2.16), (2.20), the constraint on work-in-process
(2.17) and the working capital constraint (2.18).
29Loan and borrowing cost are paid to the financial intermediary which in turn gives the returns
to the household. As assumed, the default rate is such that the return to the household is zero. The
role of the financial intermediary is that all households loan to all producers in equal proportions.
This guarantees that the expected return of zero equals the actual return
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Table 2.10: Producers accounting: stage 2
Working capital
κ1Ptno
kp
t
Dt
κ2It
Φ(nokpt )
κ2It
Φ(nokpt )
κ1PtNOt
Dt
Accounts payable
(1 +Rt)Dt
(1− κ2)It
(1 +Rt)Dt
(1− κ2)It
Revenue
κ1PtNOt
(1− κ2P¯tθXt
Operation costs
RtDt
It
Φ(nokpt )
Dividend payments
κ1Ptno
kp
t
(1− κ1)P¯tθXt
It
RtDt
Φ(nokpt )
Notes: T-ledger of transactions made by the capital goods producer during the second
stage. Following standard practices, left column corresponds to debits, right to
credits. Revenue accounts are credit accounts, costs accounts are debit accounts.
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Household
There is a measure one of identical households that own capital Kt which they use
together with their labor to produce the consumption good through a technology
F (K,N) = ϕtK
α
t N
1−α
t (2.22)
where the productivity shifter ϕt follows a first order Markov process. To purchase
capital the household makes new orders nohht at the beginning of the period and pays
a fraction κ1 of their market price up-front. New orders increase the stock of the
household’s unfilled orders ufohht . At the end of the period, the household receives
shipments of capital goods ℓtufohht and pays a fraction (1−κ1) of their value according
to the average value of the stock of unfilled orders. The variable ℓt summarizes the
production schedule chosen by the capital goods producer and taken as given by the
household.30 The capital stock and the stock of unfilled orders evolve according to
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ℓtufohht (2.23)
ufohht = (1− d)(1− ℓt−1)ufohht−1 + nohht (2.24)
The capital producers pay dividends Πt to the households. The household budget
constraint is given by
Ct + Ptno
hh
t + P¯tℓtufo
hh
t +Bt+1 = (1 + rt−1)Bt + F (Kt, Nt) + Πt (2.25)
where Bt represents the household position on a one period bond. The household
30The rate at which the household’s investment turns into productive capital, ℓt, fills-in the place
of the marginal-efficiency-of-investment (MEI) wedge introduced by Justiniano et al. (2011), who
find it to be the main driver of U.S. business cycles in the post-war period. This model points
towards possible micro-foundations for this type of shocks.
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maximizes utility according to
max
∞∑
t=0
βt(u(Ct)− ν(Nt)) (2.26)
subject to (2.24), (2.23) and (2.25). The first order necessary conditions are
collected on Appendix D.
Aggregation
Let NOt and UFOt be the aggregate level of new orders and unfilled orders, respec-
tively. The aggregate resources constraint in this economy is
Ct + It + Φ(NOt) +DtR(UFOt, Dt) = F (Kt, Nt) (2.27)
Aggregate unfilled orders relate to aggregate beginning of period unfilled orders
by
UFOt = UFO
b
t − Shipt (2.28)
Given the assumptions on households and producers the model aggregates triv-
ially. In equilibrium we have that
NOt = no
hh
t = no
kp
t , UFO
b
t = ufo
hh
t = ufo
kp
t
Shipt = ℓtUFO
b
t = θXt
For a full Equilibrium definition see Appendix D
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Non-linearities and Solution method
Constraints (2.17) and (2.18) are important to understand the cyclical behavior of
the producer as they are occasionally binding. On the one hand, the cyclicality of the
ratio of unfilled orders to shipments implies that (2.17) does not bind all the time.
On the other hand, taking a look back at Figure (2.5), which I reproduce below, we
find some evidence of the constraint binding, midway through expansions, when the
ratio of unfilled orders to shipments flattens.
Figure 2.5: HP-detrended UFO/Ship ratio and GDP (repeated from page 18)
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Notes: HP-filtered ratio of unfilled orders over shipments for “Non-defense
equipment excluding aircraft” from the M3 survey and HP-filtered log-GDP from
NIPA tables. Recession bands correspond to the NBER recession classification
As for (2.18), the financing friction mechanism relies on the constraint binding
in periods when new orders are low and to slack when new orders are high. The
producers Euler equation for unfilled orders is given by
µt = βE
[
u′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
µt+1
]
+ pi1t −R1(ufokpt , Dt) (2.29)
The last element on the right-hand-side adds to the shadow price of unfilled orders,
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as unfilled orders bring the borrowing costs down when the firm has to borrow, i.e.
when (2.18) binds. To preserve the occasionally binding constraints I compute a
piecewise-linear approximation around a steady state using the algorithm of Guerrieri
and Iacoviello (2017). The piecewise-linear policy functions allow for the dynamics
of the model to change as the constraints in the model economy switch between
binding and slack. In my model, I consider the following 4 regimes spanned from the
constraints
Table 2.11: Regimes in the model with occasionally binding constraints
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4
UFO = X UFO > X UFO = X UFO > X
WC > κ2I WC > κ2I WC = κ2I WC = κ2I
D = 0 D = 0 D ≥ 0 D ≥ 0
Notes: Regimes spanned by all possible combinations of constraints (2.17) and
(2.18).
Figure (2.11) shows impulse-response functions of the delivery lag for two cases
in which the model economy switches between regimes. In panel (a) the economy
starts in a Regime 3 steady state, with D > 0 and UFO = X. A series of positive
innovations to productivity push X away from constraint (2.17) since the firm has a
convex cost of producing X. This pushes the unfilled orders to shipments ratio up
when the economy switches into Regime 4 with UFO > X. In panel (b) the economy
starts in a Regime 2 steady state with D = 0 and UFO > X. A series of negative
productivity innovations bring new orders down to the point where (2.18) binds and
D > 0, switching into Regime 4. This is an example of the mechanism producing a
countercyclical unfilled orders to shipments ratio during downturns.
Functional forms and fixed parameters calibration
I use the following functional forms and fixed parameters calibration across all quan-
titative exercises. Following Christiano et al. (2005) and Justiniano et al. (2011) I
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Figure 2.11: Unfilled orders to shipments ratio and occasionally binding constraints
(a) UFO = X ⇒ UFO ≥ X
0 10 20 30 40 50
Linear
Piecewise
(b) WC ≥ κ2I ⇒WC = κ2I
0 10 20 30 40 50
Linear
Piecewise
Notes: Impulse response function to a series of innovations in productivity. Panel
(a) positive innovations. Panel (b) negative innovations. Simulated from piecewise
linear policy functions obtained using the algorithm of Guerrieri and Iacoviello
(2017)
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use log-utility for the instantaneous utility function. The disutility of labor function
is given by ν(N) = ψN1+
1
η
1+ 1
η
. I calibrate the inverse Frisch elasticity to η = 2 consistent
with the range of values from Chetty et al. (2011). I calibrate ψ to match a steady
state share of employment of 60%. I use a decreasing returns production function for
work-in-process f(I) = 2I
1
2
b
so that the cost of x = f(I) is quadratic in I. Finally,
the cost of turning a new order into a started project Φ(NO) = χNO is linear in new
orders so that the price Pt remains constant under one of the Baseline specifications.
The time unit is one quarter and I calibrate β = 0.99 accordingly to imply an annual
risk free rate in steady state of 4%. Capital depreciation is set to an annual rate of
13.5% in line with the average for the post-war period according to data from the
National Income and Product Accounts. I choose α = 1/3 for the capital share in the
production of the consumption good, which I assume is constant returns to scale. I
set the parameters of persistence and variance of the aggregate productivity process
as in King and Rebelo (1999). All quantitative specifications have steady states under
Regime 1 with UFO = X, WC > κ2I and Dt = 0. Table (2.12) summarizes the
values of the fixed calibration parameters.
Table 2.12: Calibration of fixed parameters
η Inverse Frisch elasticity 2
β Discount factor 0.99
δ Capital depreciation 0.034
α Capital share of production 1/3
ρ Persistence of productivity process 0.95
σϕ Std dev of innovations to productivity 0.007
Notes: Fixed calibration parameters are common across all specifications and are set
according to the standards in the literature
Baseline calibrations
I calibrate the model to produce two baseline specifications. First, a standard invest-
ment model, equivalent to an RBC model, with no working capital constraint and no
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delivery lags. Second, a model with delivery lags similar to that in Section 2.3. I will
refer to these two specifications as Standard and Delivery Lag, respectively.
Standard specification Under the calibration for the Standard specification,
the model economy will remain under Regime 1 for most productivity innovations. I
set θ = 1 so that
UFOt = Xt = θXt = Shipt = NOt, UFOt = 0,
UFOt
Shipt
= 0
Under the standard specification Pt = P¯t = P , the value of the price in steady
state. Since new orders equals shipments under this calibration, I set the parameter
χ on the cost of new orders to 1 and calibrate b in the production function of work-
in-process to match the ratio of the standard deviations of shipments to GDP. Table
(2.13) shows moments of the model alongside their data counterparts. The moments
that I target for calibration are Marked with a box. The volatility of shipments is
summarized by σShip/σGDP = 3.5 in the data. The model falls short of the target with
a maximum attainable value of around 2. This will be true across all calibrations of
the model, hence the Standard calibration will serve as my benchmark for shipments
volatility to compare against the other specifications. As for the untargeted moments,
the model does a good job matching the persistence of shipments but shipments are
more procyclical than in the data.
Delivery Lag specification Under the Delivery Lag calibration, I set the pa-
rameter κ1 so that the economy enters Regime 2, with UFO > X, with the necessary
frequency to target the relative volatility of the unfilled orders to shipments ratio.
The parameter θ, which essentially reflects the technical delivery lag given technol-
ogy, is set to target a steady state unfilled orders to shipments ratio of 1. As before,
I set b to target shipments volatility but now I calibrate χ to match the ratio of the
standard deviation of new orders to that of shipments, 1.6. Table (2.13) shows on its
last column the resulting moments from the model, marked with boxes those targeted
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in calibration.
As with the Standard calibration, the model falls short of generating enough
volatility of shipments to match the data with a value of σShip/σGDP = 2. The other
targeted moments fair better. The ratio σNO/σShip = 1.3 is close to the 1.6 target and
the volatility of the unfilled orders to shipments ratio matches that of the data. For
the untargeted moments, the model does a good job with the volatility of new orders
and the persistence of all variables. As with the Standard calibration, all variables
are more procyclical in the model than in the data. As expected, the model generates
a procyclical unfilled orders to shipments ratio.
In contrast with the Standard calibration, the Delivery Lag one generates variation
in unfilled orders and their ratio to shipments by having constraint (2.17) only bind
occasionally. Figure (2.12) compares on panel (a) the impulse-response functions of
investment between the two calibrations to a positive innovation to productivity that
increases GDP by one standard deviation at its peak, around 2%. The peak response
of investment is higher at 6.4% under the Standard calibration compared to 4.7% in
the Delivery Lag. However, The cumulative response is only slightly higher under the
Standard calibration at 1.03 times that of the Delivery Lag one. The response under
the Delivery Lag calibration is hump-shaped, consistent with empirical findings and
has higher persistence than under the Standard calibration.
Non-linear dynamics The size of the innovations matter because of the nonlin-
earities in the model. On panel (b) of Figure (2.12) we see the response to an innova-
tion that increases GDP by 5% at its peak. The peak response of investment under
the Standard calibration is now twice as big as the peak response under the Delivery
Lag calibration. Under the latter, as the marginal cost of producing capital goods
increases, constraint (2.17) stops binding and the unfilled orders to shipments ratio
increases. This reduces the peak response of investment as unfilled orders accumulate.
The cumulative response is only 1.1 times larger under the Standard calibration, as
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Table 2.13: Moments from the data and the baseline models
New orders NO
Data Standard Delivery Lag
Corr(GDP,NO) 0.76 0.91 0.91
Corr(NOt, NOt−1) 0.80 0.92 0.91
σNO/σGDP 5.6 2.0 2.6
End-of-Period UFOend
Data Standard Delivery Lag
Corr(GDP,UFOend) 0.36 – 0.82
Corr(UFOendt , UFO
end
t−1) 0.94 – 0.99
σUFOend/σGDP 5.0 – 5.2
Investment Ship
Data Standard Delivery Lag
Corr(GDP, Ship) 0.66 0.91 0.94
Corr(Shipt, Shipt−1) 0.91 0.92 0.97
σShip/σGDP 3.5 2.0 2.1
Delivery lag dlag
Data Standard Delivery Lag
Corr(GDP,Rat) -0.26 – 0.64
Corr(Ratt, Ratt−1) 0.91 – 0.99
σRat/σGDP 4.1 – 4.1
Notes: Moments generated from HP-filtered data from the M3 survey. Model
moments correspond to theoretical moments of the linearized model for the Standard
calibration and to HP-filtered data simulated for one thousand periods after
discarding a 150 periods burn-in for the Delivery Lag calibration. Simulations use a
piecewise linear policy function around a steady state obtained with the algorithm of
Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017)
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the accumulated unfilled orders under the Delivery Lag calibration keep the response
of investment up for longer.
Figure 2.12: Response of investment to a positive innovation to productivity
(a) 2% peak response of GDP
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(b) 5% peak response of GDP
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Notes: Impulse response functions to positive innovations to the productivity
process. Responses are generated using the piecewise linear policy function obtained
with the algorithm in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), around a non-stochastic
steady state. The responses correspond to the real value of shipments, this is,
shipments of capital goods times the average price of unfilled orders.
Hump-shaped dynamics The hump-shaped dynamics in the Delivery Lag model
are driven by the momentum in the accumulation of work-in-process produced by the
technical delivery lag θ. This feature makes each increase in the stock of work-in-
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process have a (declining) effect on future shipments. For example, If the producer
increases the stock of work-in-process after the impulse by xt, shipments increase by
θxt and the stock of work in process next period Xt+1 by (1 − θ)xt. Then xt ha
a contribution t shipments next period of θ(1 − θ)xt and in general, j periods out,
the change made to work in process at time t contributes to shipments at t + j by
θ(1− θ)jxt. Figure (2.13) shows on panel (a) the response of investment to the same
productivity innovation for different values of theta. As θ decreases the peak response
falls and the tail of impulse-response function becomes fatter and longer.
Increasing the value of κ1 makes constraint (2.17) stop binding more frequently31.
Panel (b) shows the responses holding θ = 1 and increasing the value of κ1. Increasing
κ1 leads to investment responses that have lower peaks and fatter tails, just as we get
from decreasing θ. However, with θ = 1 the response looses its characteristic shape.
Figure 2.14 shows the effect of θ on the responses prices. In panel (a) we can
see that θ has little effect on the market price of a new order. In panel (b) we see a
hump-shaped response of the average price of an unfilled order with lower peaks and
fatter tails as θ decreases. Equation (2.15) shows that the evolution of P¯t depends on
the evolution of Xt, explaining how it inherits the shape of its dynamics.32
In summary, the Delivery Lag does a relatively good job at matching data mo-
ments with the big exception of the negative correlation of the unfilled orders to
shipments ratio with GDP. This calibration generates responses of investment that
are hump-shaped and non-linear on the size of the shocks. The cumulative responses
of investment are similar between the Standard and the Delivery Lag calibration.
However, the peak response in the Delivery Lag calibration is lower and its tail is
31As κ1 increases the shadow price pi1, on constraint (2.17) binding, decreases. This brings the
steady state of the model closer to where the constraint stops binding.
32In Appendix D I show the results of the model analysis without the average price assumption by
setting P¯t = Pt. None of the conclusions of the analysis rely on this assumption, the hump-shaped
response of shipments included.
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Figure 2.13: Response of investment to a positive innovation to productivity
(a) Values of steady state delivery lag
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(b) Values of the shadow price of (2.17) binding
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Notes: Impulse response functions to positive innovations to the productivity
process. Responses are generated using the piecewise linear policy function obtained
with the algorithm in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), around a non-stochastic
steady state. The responses correspond to the real value of shipments, this is,
shipments of capital goods times the average price of unfilled orders.
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Figure 2.14: Responses of the prices of investment to a positive innovation to pro-
ductivity
(a) Market price of new orders
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(b) Average price of unfilled orders
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Notes:Impulse response functions to positive innovations to the productivity process.
Responses are generated using the piecewise linear policy function obtained with the
algorithm in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), around a non-stochastic steady state.
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fatter.
Financing friction calibration
Finally, I calibrate the parameters of the borrowing cost function and the share of
costs κ2 that the capital producer must pay up-front. I depart from the procedure
followed in Section 2.3 to calibrate some of these parameters. The estimated elasticity
of the financing cost to unfilled orders from Section 2.4, ζ1 = −0.06, is too low for
the general equilibrium model to deliver a countercyclical unfilled orders to shipments
ratio. I fix the ratio between ζ1 and the elasticity ζ2 = 0.33, as estimated in Section 2.4
at 0.19, and calibrate κ2 and ζ1 jointly in order to match the correlation between the
unfilled orders to shipments ratio and GDP and the ratio of the standard deviations
of unfilled orders and GDP. Table (2.14) shows on the right column, the moments
generated from this exercise. The calibration fairs slightly better than the baselines
at matching the volatility of shipments. For untargeted moments the model does
well in matching the persistence of the variables but, once again generates shipments
and new orders that are more procyclical than the data. The model does better at
matching the low positive correlation between unfilled orders and GDP. Finally, the
model achieves the countercyclicality and volatility of the unfilled orders to shipments
ratio. In general, I conclude that the model with the financing friction does a good
job compared to the baseline specifications and is capable of replicating the cyclical
behavior of the unfilled orders to shipments ratio.
2.7 Investment dynamics
In Section 2.6 I discussed two important implications for aggregate investment dynam-
ics, the hump-shaped responses and the non-linear effect of the size of shocks. With
the Financial Friction calibration there are two new features to discuss, the model
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Table 2.14: Moments from the data and the baseline models
New orders NO
Data Standard Delivery Lag Fin. Fric.
Corr(GDP,NO) 0.76 0.91 0.91 0.92
Corr(NOt, NOt−1) 0.80 0.92 0.91 0.92
σNO/σGDP 5.6 2.0 2.6 2.8
End-of-Period UFOend
Data Standard Delivery Lag Fin. Fric.
Corr(GDP,UFOend) 0.36 – 0.82 0.17
Corr(UFOendt , UFO
end
t−1) 0.94 – 0.99 0.98
σUFOend/σGDP 5.0 – 5.2 4.11
Investment Ship
Data Standard Delivery Lag Fin. Fric.
Corr(GDP, Ship) 0.66 0.91 0.94 0.90
Corr(Shipt, Shipt−1) 0.91 0.92 0.97 0.97
σShip/σGDP 3.5 2.0 2.1 2.2
Delivery lag dlag
Data Standard Delivery Lag Fin. Fric.
Corr(GDP, dlag) -0.26 – 0.64 −0.28
Corr(dlagt, dlagt−1) 0.91 – 0.99 0.99
σdlag/σGDP 4.1 – 4.1 4.3
Notes: Moments generated from HP-filtered data from the M3 survey. Model
moments correspond to theoretical moments of the linearized model for the Standard
calibration and to HP-filtered data simulated for one thousand periods after
discarding a 150 periods burn-in for the Delivery Lag and Financial Friction
calibrations. Simulations use a piecewise linear policy function around a steady state
obtained with the algorithm of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017)
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delivers investment responses that are asymmetric and can have slow recoveries.
Asymmetric responses and State-dependence
The nonlinearities in the model produce an asymmetry between the responses
of investment to positive and negative shocks. After a negative shock, the fall in
new orders puts downward pressure on working capital. As the financing constraint
(2.18) binds and the cost of production increases due to borrowing costs. The capital
goods producers accumulate unfilled orders relative to shipments, making the fall in
investment stronger. Figure (2.16) compares responses of investment to positive and
negative shocks. The positive and negative responses from the Standard and Delivery
Lag models are symmetric. The response to a negative shock in the Financial Friction
model has a through about half a percentage point farther away from the steady
state than the response to a positive shock. Further, the cumulative response to the
negative shock is 9.7% larger than the response to the positive shock.
On the other hand, positive shocks put downward pressure on pi1, the shadow
price on constraint (2.17). This follows from the producer’s Euler equation for unfilled
orders, equation (2.29). When the constraint stops binding, the producer accumulates
unfilled orders, weakening the response of investment. This is the case on panel (b)
of Figure (2.12).
Together, these two mechanisms produce the state-dependence discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3. A lower elasticity of shipments with respect to GDP in expansions than
in downturns. Meanwhile, the elasticity of unfilled orders to GDP will be higher in
expansions than in downturns. Table (2.15) shows these elasticities estimated from
the model along with their data counterparts. The model does an outstanding job at
replicating the difference in elasticities between the two states.33
Slow recoveries
33The only caveat is that the model generates a negative elasticity of unfilled orders to GDP
when the economy is below trend. However, the changes in magnitude of the elasticities are fairly
accurate.
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Figure 2.15: Asymmetric response of investment
(a) Positive productivity shock
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(b) Negative productivity shock
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Notes:Impulse response functions to positive innovations to the productivity process.
Responses are generated using the piecewise linear policy function obtained with the
algorithm in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), around a non-stochastic steady state.
The responses correspond to the real value of shipments, this is, shipments of capital
goods times the average price of unfilled orders.
58
Table 2.15: Elasticities with respect to GDP when GDP is above and below trend
Data Ship UFO
Above Below Above Below
1.74 2.5 3.01 1.19
Model Ship UFO
Above Below Above Below
1.45 2.49 3.82 -0.51
Notes: Elasticities are computed from HP-filtered data from the M3 survey. Model
elasticities correspond are produced from HP-filtered data simulated for one thousand
periods after discarding a 150 periods burn-in from the Financial Friction
calibration. Simulations use a piecewise linear policy function around a steady state
obtained with the algorithm of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017)
The non-linearities in the response of investment in the model can produce slower
recoveries, relative to the Standard calibration. For large shocks, as the financing con-
straint binds, the producer accumulates more unfilled orders relative to shipments.
The value of θ < 1, the convex cost of turning started projects into work-in-process
and the value of unfilled orders as collateral will deter the producer from turning un-
filled orders into shipments rapidly. The producer sheds these unfilled orders through
a longer period of time, carried in part by the momentum of having a delivery lag.
In contrast, in the Standard calibration, shipments are always equal to new orders,
there are no incentives to hold unfilled orders that can slow the recovery. Table (2.16)
compares the number of quarters it takes for the response of investment in the Fi-
nancial Friction calibration to catch-up with the response of the Standard calibration
for different size of shocks. For a shock that decreases GDP by 2% at the trough,
the difference in the recovery between the two models is negligible. As the shock
increases the duration of the recovery increases dramatically. For a shock that brings
GDP down by 4% at the trough it takes 12 quarters for the Financial Friction model
to catch-up with the Standard model.
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Table 2.16: Quarters until Financial Friction model catches-up to Standard model
GDP decline Description Quarters
2% One standard deviation of GDP 0
4% Comparable to Great Recession 12
6% — 19
Notes: Quarters represents the number of periods after the through, that it takes for
the response of investment under the Financial Friction calibration to cross the
response under the Standard calibration. Responses are generated using the
piecewise linear policy function obtained with the algorithm in Guerrieri and
Iacoviello (2017), around a non-stochastic steady state. The responses correspond to
the real value of shipments, this is, shipments of capital goods times the average
price of unfilled orders.
The Great Recession
As a test of the importance of the mechanism for investment dynamics, I compare the
responses of investment under both the Standard and Financial Friction calibration
to a shock that produces a decrease in GDP to its trough comparable to the drop in
the Great Recession. The fall of GDP from its peak in 2007q4 to its trough in 2009Q2
was 4.3%. Panel (a) of Figure (??) shows these responses. The drop at the trough
is similar across the two calibrations, 14.9% in the Standard model and 13.9% in the
Financial Friction one. The dynamics differ in a clear way, with the Financial Friction
calibration producing a hump-shaped response. The cumulative response under the
Financial Friction calibration is 67% bigger than under the Standard one. In part, this
follows from the slower recovery of the former, taking 16 quarters to catch-up to the
response under the Standard calibration. In essence there are significant differences
in investment dynamics for large enough shocks. These differences are able to explain
investment slumps after important crises. For comparison Panel (b) shows the cyclical
component of investment during and after the great recession. Investment presents a
hump-shaped response that drops almost 22% at its trough, larger that my results for
either calibration. The recovery, from through to its level of 4% above trend before
the steep drop, takes 11 and 20 quarters. This is similar to what the model predicts.
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Figure 2.16: Response of investment to a Great Recession shock
(a) Model response of investment
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(b) Cyclical component of investment in the data
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Notes:Responses are generated using the piecewise linear policy function obtained
with the algorithm in Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), around a non-stochastic
steady state. The responses correspond to the real value of shipments, this is,
shipments of capital goods times the average price of unfilled orders. Data on
investment corresponds to hp-filter log-investment. Investment is the series on Real
Gross Private Domestic Investment from the BEA
61
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper I have described some important features of the cyclical behavior of
shipments and unfilled orders of capital goods producers. Mainly, their behavior is
state-dependent: the elasticity of shipments with respect to GDP is higher during
downturns and the opposite is true for the elasticity of unfilled orders. This behavior
can be explained by the introduction of financial frictions. I show in the data that
capital producers that face financial constraints, as they would in a downfall, respond
to new orders by increasing shipments less than an unconstrained firm and increasing
unfilled orders more than the unconstrained counterpart. In a downfall the fall of
new orders makes shipments of capital goods fall more than they would without the
financial friction, increasing the elasticity of shipments with respect to GDP and
decreasing the elasticity of unfilled orders. This is exactly the behavior we see in the
data. I calibrate a quantitative dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that
incorporates delivery lags in capital goods production and the financial friction as
occasionally binding constraints. I show that accounting for this state-dependence is
important to understand the dynamics of investment during downturns and recoveries.
As an application, following a negative shock that decreases GDP as much as in the
Great Recession, the model produces a cumulative fall of investment 67% higher than
the response in a standard RBC model. The recovery is also slower in the model with
the financial friction, where the response of investment takes 16 quarters to catch-up
with the response generated by the standard RBC model.
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Chapter III
What Inventory Behavior Tells Us About Changes
in the Price Markup
(with Andrew D. Usher)
3.1 Introduction
The increase in market concentration in several industries through the second half of
the twentieth1 century has brought the literature to pay close attention to many of
the changes that may accompany this. For example, Gutierrez and Philippon (2018)
point to this as a possible culprit for under investment. Autor et al. (2017) study the
fall in the labor share resulting from increasing concentration due to heterogeneous
productivity. The question of the degree of market power that firms hold because of
this concentration is still open and the price markup, defined as the ratio between
sale price and marginal cost, provides away to start answering it.
Given the difficulty to acquire good quality price and marginal cost information,
economist have resorted to estimate the price markup through several methods, mak-
ing use of equilibrium and firm’s optimization conditions. One of the favored method-
1See for example Gutierrez and Philippon (2018)
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ologies when estimated the markup for several industries is based on Hall (1988) and
makes use of the first order condition of the firms variable cost minimization prob-
lem. Notably, recent work by Loecker et al. (2020) used this result, along with balance
sheet firm data, to estimate the change in the economy-wide markup since the 1960’s.
In their results, they find that the price markup may have rise by as much as 60%.
This finding, has sparked big interest in the topic because of the implications that a
change of this magnitude would have.
Basu (2019) pointed out a concern with this estimation. A change in the price-
markup of the magnitude found by Loecker et al. (2020) should be accompanied by
significant changes in the economy which are not aparent. Albeit, no estimation
method is perfect and using the cost minimization first order conditions may have
shortcomings. Mainly, the costs used in estimation should correspond to variable
inputs of production. Two problems arise with this assumption, first, the way firms
keep their accounting records of cost may vary significantly. Having firms report some
overhead fixed costs as cost of production when others may not. Second, some inputs
used in production may not correspond to the cost of goods sold if the firms holds
down inventories.
In this paper we look to contribute to the debate by looking at the change in price
markup through a different first order condition. Based on Bils and Kahn (2000)
we consider the problem of a firm that must hold inventories to produce sales. The
first order condition of the firm ties down the price-markup to the ratio of the stock
available to sales, an important statistic in the literature of inventories. Intuitively,
the cost to the firm of missing a sale is given by the markup. In times when the
markup is higher, the firm will want to hold larger quantities of inventories. This
way, the stock to
sales ratio, which is readily available from balance sheet data, provides informa-
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tion on the changes of the price markup.
In addition to the stock to sales ratio, our first order condition includes the ex-
pected growth rate of marginal cost. We use balance sheet data to estimate the firms
production function to back out total factor productivity. This variable reflects both
technology and input price changes and can be used to forecast the firm’s marginal
cost growth. Our first order condition, allows us to remain agnostic to changes in
prices or market structure and the actual breakdown of the cost of production.
In our estimation, we find that the stock to sales ratio, accounting for changes
in the productivity of the stock is decreasing through the entire period, as previ-
ously documented in the literature2. However, the firms discounted marginal cost
growth increases through time, due to a decreasing discount rate and a relatively
flat marginal cost series. The combination of these factors point towards a slightly
decreasing markup, with a fall of around 5% between 1970 and 2018. Most of the fall
happens throughout the 70’s and 80’s decades and the series becomes relatively flat
starting in the 2000’s.
Two factors lead to the conclusion of falling markups. First, the falling stock to
sales ratio reflects a smaller loss of the firm when a sale is not produced. This remains
true even when adjusting for the increase in the productivity of the stock to produce
sales. Second, the falling discount rate implies a falling cost of carrying inventories
which should make the firm more willing to hold stock in order to produce sales. Our
conclusion from this results is that further study of the importance of firm dynamics
are necessary in order to understand the changes in the price-markup. Static first
order conditions, while convenient, appear to be missing important information given
2see McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000)
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the changes in the dynamic variables of the firms problem, the stock available and
the discount rate.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we present a theoretical
framework in which firms hold a stock of the final good in order to produce sales and
smooth the cost of production. Section 3 presents the methodology and results of
the estimation of the adjusted stock to sales ratio and discounted expected growth
in marginal cost. In section 4 we use the estimated series to back the changes in the
price markup. Section 5 presents conclusions.
3.2 Theoretical framework
In this section we develop a model similar to Bils and Kahn (2000) in which firms hold
inventories to facilitate sales. This is the current consensus reached in the literature,
as it explains procyclical inventory investment. Inventories, or more specifically, the
available stock, can facilitate sales by, for example, preventing stockouts or allowing
to match products with costumers. 3. In our model sales of the final good consist of
successful matches between consumers and the available stock, at. The firm chooses
both the available stock and price pt before matching happens and after observing
the aggregate state of the economy Θt. Given the stock, price and the aggregate
state, consumers search for the product with an intensity 0 ≤ d(pt,Θt) ≥ 1. Sales are
determined by a matching function given by
st(pt, at; Θt) = d(pt; Θt)a
φt
t (3.1)
3For a broader discussion of inventory investment behavior see for example Wen (2005).
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By construction st ≤ at. The time-varying parameter 0 < φt ≤ 1 is the elasticity
of sales with respect to stock and represents how essential the stock available is to
successfully match with consumers. To understand the nature of this parameter
consider the perfect competition example where
d(pt; Θt) =
 1 if pt = p
∗
t
0 if pt ̸= p∗t
(3.2)
In this case, consumers will buy the product at the market price as long as they
are successfully matched with it. Matching will only depend on the stock available.
Consider two types of firms, the first firm has a fixed share of the stock across its
stores. The second firm has a distribution network between its stores, allowing to
move stock where necessary. Even if both firms produce the same stock a∗, the sec-
ond firm will reach more consumers facilitating matches and sales, this is captured
by a higher level of φt. The time variation in φt is due to changes in distribution and
inventory management technology through time.
Let yt be the level of production of the final good at a cost given by the function
C(yt;ωt) where ωt represents the realization of the firms idiosyncratic productivity.
The stock available evolves according to
at = at−1 − st−1 + yt (3.3)
With the matching function 3.1 and assuming both aggregate state and produc-
tivity processes are first order Markov, the solution to the the profit maximization
problem of the firm satisfies the following Bellman Equation subject to 3.1 and 3.3
V (a; Θ, ω) = max
p,a′
{ps− C(y;ω) + E [βV (a′; Θ′, ω′)]} (3.4)
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Here β represents the realization of the stochastic discount factor. Let ct be
the marginal cost of production of the firm in period t. Combining the first order
condition ∂a′ with the Benveniste-Scheinkman envelope equation for the state a, we
get Equation 3.5
1 = φt
st
at
pt
ct
+
(
1− φst
at
)
E
[
βt+1
ct+1
ct
]
(3.5)
The first order condition with respect to price is given by
1 = ξtptE
[
1− βt+1 ct+1
pt
]
(3.6)
Where ξ is the price elasticity of the search intensity function d(pt; Θt). Notice
that the search intensity function d(pt; Θt) appears in equation 3.5 only through the
ratio of sales to the stock available st
at
, which is observable in the data. Focusing on
equation 3.5 allows us to remain agnostic to the shape of d(pt; Θt), meaning equation
3.5 remains valid under any type of market structure that can be modeled in this
way. This includes the cases of perfect competition and monopoly.
The derivative of sales with respect to the stock available is φt stat so we can re-
arrange equation 3.5 as follows to get an interpretation. At the optimal choice of
at a perturbation ∆at must be such that the change in costs equals the change in
revenue,composed by the fraction of ∆at sold at a price of pt and the fraction kept in
inventory with a shadow value of E [βt+1ct+1].
ct∆at =
∂st
∂at
∆atpt +
(
1− ∂st
∂at
)
E [βt+1ct+1] ∆at
Using equation 3.5 we can study changes in the price markup through the changes
in the other firm-level variables connected to it. Solving for pt
ct
yields
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pt
ct
=
1
φt
at
st
−
(
1
φt
at
st
− 1
)
E
[
βt+1
ct+1
ct
]
(3.7)
Lets assume that marginal cost is constant (or decreasing) through time, so that
E
[
βt+1
ct+1
ct
]
< 1. In that case the equilibrium markup holds a strictly positive rela-
tion with 1
φ
at
st
. The markup is the forgone benefit when a match fails hence, in times
when the markup is high, the firm wants a higher stock relative to sales in order to
successfully match. Additionally, changes in technology represented by φt affect the
relation between the stock to sales ratio and the markup. At a given markup, if φt
becomes higher, meaning the firm is better at converting stock into sales, the firm
will hold a lower stock.
As we can see, the changes in markup in the last four decades can be inferred
by the changes of these three variables, the stock-to-sales ratio, the expected change
in marginal cost, and the elasticity φt. In the following section we will look at the
historical behavior of this variables and work our way to the implication for the price
markup.
3.3 Historical look of the firms’ production
In this section we use annual firm level data from Compustat for the period between
1970 and 2017, to recover or estimate the variables connected to the price markup.
We assume the firm has a production technology that takes variable inputs, L and
capital, K given by
Yit = e
ωitLα
L
j Kα
K
j (3.8)
The production function parameters vary by industry as classified by two digits
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NAICS codes. There is no constraint on returns to scale through the parameters, we
allow them to take any positive value.
3.3.1 Firm’s forecast of marginal cost growth
The last term in equation 3.7 is the expected growth of discounted marginal cost for
the firm. We take the stance of modeling this as a forecast made by the firm with the
information available until the moment of the forecast. Two components enter these
value, the stochastic discount factor and the growth rate of marginal cost. For a given
stock-to-sales ratio, the price markup is decreasing in both of them. If marginal cost
is higher in the future, the firm will choose to keep a higher stock for cost-smoothing
purposes, even if the markup is high.
We assume that for the forecast, the firm treats the stochastic discount factor and
the marginal cost growth rate as independent so that
ˆ
E
[
βt+1
ct+1
ct
]
= ˆE [βt+1]
ˆ
E
[
ct+1
ct
]
(3.9)
A firm forecasts the stochastic discount factor through its current financing cost,
rft . Simply put, we assume the firm chooses to discount future values using its time
cost of funds. We compute real financing costs, as the ratio between “Interest and
related expenses” and the firms total debt minus inflation4. Figure 3.1 shows in panel
(a) the average βt = (1 + rft )−1, weighted by sales, from 1970 to 2018. Notably,
financing costs have steadily declined through these five decades to the point where
the financing rate is below inflation. On average, for the last few years in our sample,
the average financing rate is about half a percentage point lower than inflation. As
4Inflation is obtained through the GDP deflator
70
a result, the discount factor used by the firm has increased mostly increased during
this period, with a few sharp declines corresponding to major recessions, as indicated
by shading.5. Starting in 2004, the discount rate has been often above one, reflecting
a financing rate below inflation.
Figure 3.1: Firms real discount factor from financing costs
(a) Sales-weighted average
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On panel (b) of Figure 3.1 we show estimated densities for the distribution of
discount factor (x-axis) across firms. In 1975, the density is almost centered a little
above 0.9 while for 2005 and 2015 most of the mass has shifted towards higher values.
5A year is shaded if the economy was in recession for at least one quarter according to NBER
recession dates.
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The quick take of this graph is that the financing rates of all firms in the sample have
decreased in this period as opposed to just the average rate. Further, the dispersion
in rates has decreased as well, meaning most firms access similar lower rates.
The second component of the firm’s forecast is the expected growth rate of
marginal cost. Given the production function 3.8, marginal cost for firm i in industry
j at time t is given by
cit = e
−ωit
(
PLit
αLj
)(
PKit
αKj
)
(3.10)
As mentioned above, L represents variable inputs rather than just labor. We
assume that for the firm forecast, only productivity is expected to change from the
current year. This is, E
[
PLit+1
]
= PLit and E
[
PKit+1
]
= PKit . Implicitly, we are also
assuming that the firm considers its forecasts for productivity and input prices to be
independent, so we treat them as multiplicatively separable through the expectation
operator. Under these assumptions we have that
E
[
ct+1
ct
]
= E
[
eωit−ωit+1
]
We follow the procedure in ? to estimate the parameters of the production func-
tion by industry. We recover the values of productivity as
ωˆit = (yit − εˆit)− βˆjKKit − βˆLj PLitLit (3.11)
Let FGIit be the final good inventories at the end of year t. The stock available
is ait = sit + FGIit. Combining this with equation 3.3 we can compute production
yit = sit+FGIit−FGIit−1. The correction term εˆ corresponds to the estimated error
from the first stage of the ACF procedure. We use “cost of goods sold” for the value
of PLitLit. Panel (a) of Figure 3.2 shows the sales-weighted average and median of
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our estimated productivity series. The productivity series increases steadily through
the period of our sample. However, for both average and median, the total increase
in the period is very modest, at around one percentage point. This points towards a
flat series of expected growth in marginal cost. There is no evident cyclical behavior
in the productivity series.
Figure 3.2: Firm’s forecast of productivity and marginal cost growth
(a) Sales-weighted average productivity
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Having the productivity series ωˆ, we build a forecast of marginal cost with a
second order polynomial regression with firm and year fixed effects. The estimated
equation is given by
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cit+1 = γi + γt + ρ1ct + ρ2c
2
t + uit+1 (3.12)
We follow Blundell and Bond (1998), instrumenting with lag-differences of the
dependent variable. Panel (b) of Figure 3.2 shows the sales-weighted average and
median of the estimated growth in marginal cost. As foreshadowed by our produc-
tivity series, the estimate for expected marginal cost growth is very flat through the
entire period. Figure 3.3 shows the estimated series of discounted expected marginal
cost growth. The contribution of the discount factor β dominates, making the series
steadily increasing through the period. This result provides the first component of
our markup estimation. From equation 3.7 we have that, holding everything else
constant, the markup is strictly decreasing in the discounted expected marginal cost
growth. Our result in this section puts pressure towards a decreasing markup in our
sample period.
Figure 3.3: Firm’s forecast of expected discounted growth in marginal cost
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3.3.2 Stock-to-sales ratio
The next component in our markup estimation is the ratio between the available
stock and the sales of the production good. This variable holds the key intuition
of this paper. If markups are increasing, the loss faced by the firm from a stockout
is also increasing. Everything else constant, a firm will increase the available stock
relative to sales to prevent stockouts as they become costlier. Figure 3.4 shows the
sales-weighted average of the ratio for all industries on panel (a). Consistent with
the literature, the ratio falls from the seventies and through the great moderation,
reaching a through in the mid-2000’s. There is a modest recovery of the ratio in the
last decade of the sample, the period after the great recession. In panel (b), we show
that this behavior is not present in all industries. In the case of retail and wholesale
trade, there is no obvious decline in the ratio. These are industries with higher
dependence on inventories, as evidenced by the larger average value and volatility of
the ratio when compared to the rest of the economy.
Equation 3.7 shows a positive relation between the markup and the ratio of avail-
able stock to sales as long as E
[
βt+1
ct+1
ct
]
< 1. Figure 3.3 shows that this is the case
on average in our data up until 2003. From 2004 onwards, our data suggests a neg-
ative relation between the markup and stock to sales ratio. This point to a markup
that should be decreasing through the entire sample period, if every other component
in equation 3.7 is held constant. However, in the case of retail and wholesale trade,
the industries for which are model should fit best, we do not see this obvious decline
of the ratio. Additionally, it is still necessary to look at was has happened to φ, the
technology that allows firms to turn available stock into sales.
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Figure 3.4: Ratio of available stock to sales
(a) All industries
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3.3.3 The elasticity of sales with respect to available stock
In this part we estimate the elasticity of sales with respect to available, φ. We estimate
the following specification as in Blundell and Bond (1998), instrumenting with lagged
differences of the variables to correct for bias in the autoregressive coefficient.
ln(ait) = γi + γt + ρln(ait−1) +
1
φ
ln(sit) + uit (3.13)
Table 3.1 shows the estimated values for the entire period in the first column.
Our estimate of phi for the entire sample is around 0.85. Lower values of phi mean
that the firm requires a higher stock available to produce sales. Given this value of φ
even under a setup in which consumers are always willing to buy the good at market
price d(p∗t ) = 1, as in the example in Section 2, a firm with a stock of a will be left
with a0.85(a0.15−1). As φ approaches 1, the firm does not require inventories to make
a sale, however, a monopoly firm can still choose to carry inventories by choosing
pt so that d(pt) < 1. From equation 3.7 we can see that increasing φ increases the
importance of the marginal cost ratio for the markup. This is because as the firm
stops requiring inventories to produce sales, it can use inventories to smooth costs of
production through time.
Table 3.1: Dynamic panel estimates of the elasticity of sales to stock available
Full sample pre 2000 post 2000
ρ -0.17 -0.46 -0.12
(0.06) (0.46) (0.04)
1
φ
1.18 1.47 1.12
(0.06) (0.46) (0.04)
Obs. 87,523 45,755 41,768
The second and third columns show estimates of φ, dividing the sample before
and after the year 2000. For the first period, from 1970 to 1999, the estimate of
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φ is around 0.68. For the second part it increase to about 0.89. This is consistent
with the changes in distribution and sales technology of the past decades. The need
of the firm to hold inventories to produce sales has decreased considerably. Firms
need lower ratios of stock available to sales, everything else equal. For example, a
firm that wanted to sell 2 units before 2000 would need an available stock of 2.77
units, delivering a ratio of available to sale of 1.39. After the year 2000, the stock
available required to sell 2 units is 2.17 and the ratio 1.09. This increase in φ allows to
accommodate the decrease in the stock to sales ratio even if markups were increasing.
3.4 The price markup
Following equation 3.7 we estimate the change in the markup through our sample
with the variable estimates from the previous section. We split the value of φ as
estimated, inputting one value for firms before the year 2000 and another one after-
wards. Figure 3.5 shows the estimated markup considering both a change in φ (panel
(a)) and holding it constant (panel (b)). In both cases we see a mild decrease in the
markup over the period. Considering a change in φ the markup decreases about 5%
and becomes relatively constant starting in the 2000’s. With a constant φ the drop is
weaker of about 2.5% points. These are the results of a decreasing stock to sales ratio
combined with a ratio of marginal cost thats both increasing and less than unity for
most of the years in our sample. After, the ratio of marginal cost becomes higher in
the 2000’s we see a markup that starts slightly recovering.
The fact that the discount rate of the firm decreases steadily produces an increas-
ing discounted marginal cost growth. It is cheaper for firms to hold inventories as
the rate goes down, making it relatively cheaper to produce presently. The decreas-
ing cost of holding inventories together with the decrease in the stock to sales ratio
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Figure 3.5: Changes in price markup, index
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implies that the relative cost to the firm of loosing a sale is decreasing, leading to the
conclusion of a falling markup.
3.5 Conclusion
The theoretical framework of our paper shows that some of the firm’s dynamic vari-
ables play an important role when determining the price-markup. If the firm is able to
hold inventories, the change in the discounted marginal cost of production in the fu-
ture becomes relevant for the firms decision to sell at a certain price. If the discounted
marginal cost of production is increasing, the firm can hold on to sell presently and
accumulate stock of the final good. However, firms in the sample are constantly re-
ducing the relative stock of final goods. This fact, follows partially from lower need
to hold stock in order to produce sales, as distribution and inventory technology has
become better. This last fact is not enough to rationalize the fall in the relative stock,
meaning that additionally, the cost to the firm of loosing a sale must be decreasing,
at least slightly. This cost is reflected by the price-markup, as a firm looses this value
when failing to complete a sale. The historical behavior of both stock and discounted
marginal cost are hard to reconcile with a scenario in which markups are increas-
ing. If markups are indeed growing, further work on the firm’s dynamic problem is
necessary to understand the puzzling behavior of the stock and cost.
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Chapter IV
Inventories Today: Stock-Out Prevention vs
Production Smoothing
4.1 Introduction
The inventories to sales ratio is a key variable to understand the firm’s intertemporal
behavior. This ratio is countercyclical, which along with procyclical inventory in-
vestment1, has led to a literature consensus that inventories are necessary to produce
sales. For example, inventories used to prevent stockouts or to match consumers
with products. As noted by Wen (2011), procyclical inventory investment follows
from the need of firms to build up a stock in order to produce sales during booms. As
marginal cost of production grows in a boom, inventory accumulation fails to keep
up with sales one-for-one, leading to a countercyclical ratio.
There are, however, important changes in the inventories to sales ratio throughout
the second half of the twentieth century. First, there has been a steady decline in
the inventories to sales ratio starting in the 1980’s. This fall has been interpreted
as a consequence of better distribution and inventory management, as argued in Mc-
Connell and Perez-Quiros (2000). As the importance of inventories to produce sales
1At mid frequencies. Inventory investment is countercyclical at high frequencies
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falls the incentives for firms to hold inventories can be driven by other factors, such
as cost smoothing or as a separate form of investment.
Second, I document that the correlation between inventory investment and cap-
ital investment has steadily decreased through the same period. Intuitively, when
firms required inventories in order to generate sales, both investment in capital and
in inventories are complements in the production of sales. In times when capital in-
vestment is high, inventory investment is also high. As the importance of inventories
to produce sales declines, the firm can choose to hold inventories to smooth the cost
of production. An increase in inventories becomes an input for future sales. In this
sense, inventory investment and capital investment become substitutes in the pro-
duction of future sales as neither is essential when the other is present. Firms with
a large stock of final good inventories may choose to delay capital investment while
they can deplete their stock. Firms that are undertaking a capital investment project
may deplete their current inventory stock as future production will increase. The
decrease in correlation not only provides some evidence in favor of inventories loos-
ing importance to produce sales but also may point to a mechanism through which
inventory holdings affect aggregate capital investment.
To analyze the mechanism behind these changes I extend the stockout prevention
model ofWen (2011) to allow for improvements in distribution technology. I calibrate
the model so that the improvement in distribution technology allows to match the
fall in the inventory to sales ratio. This calibration produces a weakening correlation
between inventory and capital investment that matches the data. Further, in the
model the change in distribution technology leads to a fall of 12% in the volatility of
capital investment relative to GDP. This finding is consistent with a world in which
firms choose either inventory investment or capital investment to increase their future
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production instead of doing it by capital investment alone.
4.2 Historical changes in inventory variables
I begin by documented two empirical facts from the second half of the twentieth
century: a fall in the inventories to sales ratio and a weakening correlation between
inventory and capital investment. Figure 4.1 shows data on the final good inventories
to sales ratio from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The lighter line corresponds to
the raw ratio of total value of final good inventories over sales and shows a consistent
decrease starting in the 1980’s until the second half of the 2000’s. The darker line
corresponds to the ratio adjusted for changes in cost of production 2. The real ratio
shows a similar behavior except that the series continues decreasing in both decades
after 2000. To understand the magnitude of this drop, consider the following, a ratio
of 5, as the one in 1974, means the firm holds 5 quarters, in terms of sales, of final
good inventories. Then the size of the fall can be seen as more than one quarter
of sales, as the ratio is below 4 at the end of the sample. Given the size of the
fall, it is plausible that other economic aggregates are affected by these changes. In
general, the literature has tried to tide this change with the Great Moderation, how-
ever, I take the more specific task of looking at the effects it has on capital investment.
In the next step, I look at the relation between inventory and capital investment
through the period. Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of the across-firm correlation
between inventory investment and the capital investment rate between 1975 to 2011.
At the beginning of the sample, the two variables have a positive relation, firms with
high inventory investment also have high capital investment. By the end of the pe-
2Both data series are from NIPA tables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The ratio is
adjusted by cost of production to account by firms reporting the value of inventories as cost of
production rather than price
83
Figure 4.1: Ratio of total inventories to sales of final goods
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riod, the positive relation has vanished, tilting slightly towards a negative correlation:
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Figure 4.2: Correlation between the capital investment rate and change in inventories
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Relating the fall in the inventories to sales ratio to the weakening correlation
between inventory and capital investment requires a theoretical framework. The way
this two may be linked is exemplified by this thought experiment
1. Improvement in distribution technology leads to a fall in the ratio
2. Firms stop holding inventories to produce sales and star holding them to smooth
the cost of production
3. In the presence of persistent demand shocks, a firm increases current and future
sales. The way they do it will differ depending on why they hold inventories.
• Inventories produce sales: firm increases inventory investment to increase
current sales. Firm increases capital investment to increase future sales.
• Inventories to smooth costs: Firm increases inventories to substitute fu-
ture production for current production. Capital investment is an input for
future production, then substituting future production for current produc-
tion will substitute capital investment for inventory investment.
In the next section, I use a theoretical framework in which firms can hold in-
ventories to produce sales and to smooth the cost of production. The model allows
for improvement in distribution technology that makes inventories less essential to
produce sales. This allows me to analyze whether the weakening correlation between
capital and inventory investment can be explained by the improvement in distribu-
tion technology.
4.3 Model
In this section I extend the stockout prevention model of ?? to allow for improvements
in distribution technology. The stock of the final good is distributed in different loca-
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tions before local demand for the good is realized. This creates a stockout prevention
reason for holding inventories that will be weakened as firms develop distribution
technology.
4.3.1 Household
The economy is comprised by one large household that consumes the final good
in a unit measure of different locations. Consumption of the good in location i is
labeled ct(i) and its subject to a location specific demand shock θt(i). I assume
the shocks to be idiosyncratic, independent and identically distributed across time
and locations. The household makes orders in each of the different location, yt(i) at
a price normalized to 1, before the realization of θt(i). The household can hold a
stock of the good in every location st(i) which depreciates at a rate d. Additionally,
there is an amount of the good Xt in a distribution center that can be send to the
different locations after the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks. These late orders
are labeled xt(i) and come at a price 1 + η. If η = 0 the household will restock the
different locations after observing the realization of θt(i), eliminating the need for
inventories to generate consumption. Figures, 4.3 and 4.4 show the different steps in
distribution before and after the realization θt(i).
The law of motion for the stock of the good in location i is given by Equation 4.1.
If η = 0 then yt(i) = 0, st(i) = 0 and xt(i) = ct(i). The stock to sales ratio is given
by st(i)/ct(i) and will decrease towards zero as η decreases. The household provides
labor Nt for the production of the final and receives a wage rate wt. Additionally,
it can hold a single type of bond Bt which pays a risk-free rate rt. The household
budget constraint is given by Equation 4.2
ct(i) + st(i) = (1− d)st−1(i) + xt(i) + yt(i) (4.1)
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Figure 4.3: Distribution before the realization of θt(i)
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Figure 4.4: Distribution after the realization of θt(i)
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1∫
0
yt(i) + (1 + η)xt(i)di+Bt+1 = (1 + rt)Bt + wtNt (4.2)
The household chooses yt(i), xt(i), ct(i), st(i), Nt and Bt+1 in order to maximize
E
∑βt φt
1− σ
 1∫
0
θt(i)ct(i)
ρdi

1−σ
ρ
− aN
1+γ
t
1 + γ
 (4.3)
subject to the law of motion of the stock in each location 4.1, the budget constraint
4.2 and nonnegativity constraints on xt(i) and st(i). There is an aggregate demand
shifter φt which generates aggregate uncertainty. Utility from consumption is CES
across time and locations, with respective elasticities of substitution σ and ρ.
Let the multipliers on each constraint be λt(i) (Equation 4.1), κt (Equation 4.2),
pit(i) (st(i) ≥ 0) and µt(i) (xt(i) ≥ 0). The first order conditions are given by
∂yt(i) :
κt = Eθλt(i)⇒ Eλt+1(i) = Eκt+1 (4.4)
∂ct(i):
φtC˜
1−σ−ρ
t θt(i)ct(i)
ρ−1 = λt(i) (4.5)
∂xt(i):
λt(i) + µt(i) = [1 + η]κt (4.6)
∂Bt+1:
κt = βE(1 + rt+1)κt+1 (4.7)
∂Nt:
aNγt = κtwt (4.8)
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∂st+1(i):
λt(i) = β(1− d)Eκt+1 + pit(i) (4.9)
Before the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks, all locations are identical and
the household will choose orders yt(i) in order to stock up on each location to the
same quantity, Tt. The multiplier, κt is the shadow value of increasing the amount
of the final good independently of which location it is stocked in. This shadow value
depends only on the realization of the aggregate shock φt and not on the realization
of the idiosyncratic shocks. The multiplier λt(i) is the shadow value of a unit of the
good in location i. A high realization of θt(i) makes the stock Tt small, relative to
the desire for the good in location i. This brings the value of λt(i) up, making an
additional unit in this location more valuable. Without idiosyncratic uncertainty,
lambdat(i) = κt for all locations i. This identity holds as well when η = 0 as we can
see in Equation 4.6. Improvements in distribution technology have the same effect as
reducing idiosyncratic uncertainty. Figure 4.5 shows the relation between λt(i) and
θt(i).
Figure 4.5: Regions according to the shock
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As in Wen (2011) there is a cutoff θt(i) > θ∗t above which the household consumes
all of the available good in location i remaining with st(θt(i)) = 0. Below this cutoff,
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an additional unit of the good in location i will stay in inventory, making the value
λt(i) = β(1− d)Eκt+1. The ability to restock after the idiosyncratic shocks produces
a second cutoff θ∗∗t = (1+η)κtβ(1−d)Eκt+1 θ∗t > θ∗t above which the household makes additional
orders xt(i) > 0 to consume. The shadow value λt(i) = (1 + η)κt since the household
could choose to stock after the idiosyncratic shock.
4.3.2 The firm
A representative firm produces the final good for all locations, taking both input and
final good prices as given. The firm faces a cost of adjusting capital that depends on
the deviation from the steady state level. The firm’s problem is to choose capital and
labor inputs in order to maximize
E
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
s=0
1
1 + rt
)
(AKαt N
1−α
t − wtNt − It −
χK¯
2
(
It
K¯
− δ)2) (4.10)
subject to the capital law of motion
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt (4.11)
with an associated Lagrange multiplier qt, the shadow value of installed capital. The
first order conditions are fairly standard and given by
∂It:
It
K¯
− δ = 1
χ
(qt − 1) (4.12)
∂Kt+1:
qt = E
[(
1
1 + rt+1
)
(MPKt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1)
]
(4.13)
∂Nt:
(1− α)A
(
Kt
Nt
)α
= wt (4.14)
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4.3.3 Aggregation
Since the cutoffs θ∗t and θ∗∗t do not depend on the realizations of θt(i) I can obtain
economic aggregates that depend only on aggregate uncertainty. This is particularly
desirable since there is no need to keep track of the distribution of state variables
across location and allows to solve the model by linear approximation around a steady
state with no aggregate uncertainty. Given a distribution F (θ) of the idiosyncratic
shocks and letting υt = Eκt+1κ , the aggregate variables κt, C˜t =
(∫ 1
0
θt(i)ct(i)
ρdi
) 1
ρ ,
Ct =
∫ 1
0
c(i)tdi, St =
∫ 1
0
s(i)tdi, Xt =
∫ 1
0
x(i)tdi and Tt = St + Ct − Xt are given as
functions of θ∗t ,υt,η by
φtC˜
−σ
t = β(1− d)Eκt+1G(θ∗t , υt, η)−
1−ρ
ρ (E1)
κt = φtC˜
−σ
t R(θ
∗
t , υt, η)G(θ
∗
t , υt, η)
1−ρ
ρ (E2)
Ct = C˜tD(θ
∗
t , υt, η)G(θ
∗
t , υt, η)
− 1
ρ (E3)
St = Ct
H1(θ
∗
t )
D(θ∗t , υt, η)
(E4)
Xt = Ct
H2(θ
∗
t , υt, η)
D(θ∗t , υt, η)
(E5)
Tt =
D(θ∗t , υt, η) +H1(θ
∗
t )−H2(θ∗t , υt, η)
D(θ∗t , υt, η)
Ct (E6)
where G(θ∗, υ, η), D(θ∗, υ, η), R(θ∗, υ, η), H1(θ∗) and H2(θ∗, υt, η) are auxiliary
functions that depend on the distribution chosen for θ. I define these auxiliary func-
tions in Appendix E.
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4.3.4 Equilibrium
The equations from the goods producing firm are already in terms of economic ag-
gregates, to summarize them, we have
A labor demand equation
(1− α)AtKαt N−αt = a
Nγt
κt
(E7)
An investment demand equation
It
K¯
− δ = 1
χ
(qt − 1) (E8)
The Euler equation for capital
qt = E
[(
1
1 + rt+1
)
(MPKt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1)
]
(E9)
The capital law of motion
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt (E10)
Finally, we have an Euler equation for savings
κt = βE(1 + rt+1)κt+1 (E11)
and the aggregate resources constraint
Ct+St− (1−d)St−1+Kt+1− (1−δ)Kt+ χK¯
2
(
It
K¯
− δ
)2
+ηXt = AtK
α
t N
1−α
t (E12)
An equilibrium for the aggregated economy is given by sequences for the 12 en-
dogenous variables
{
κt, qt, rt, θ
∗
t , C˜t, Ct, St, Xt, Tt, Kt+1, It, Nt
}
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that solve the dynamic system E1-E12, given initial values {K0, S0}, a process for
the exogenous variable {φt, } and the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks F (θ).
4.4 Solution and calibration
I derive a linear approximation of the model around a solution with φt = 1. To com-
pare the model after an improvement on distribution technology I use two calibrations
such that the comparison model has a parameter η′ < η. Figure 4.6 shows the effect
of reducing η in the steady state solution of the model3. Improvement in distribution
technology, reflected in η′ < η, lowers the thresholds at which the household holds no
inventories s(i) = 0 and starts ordering after the realization of θ(i), x(i) > 0.
Figure 4.6: The relative shadow values in steady state
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For the calibrations of the model I assume a quarterly frequency and that the
idiosyncratic shocks θ follow a Pareto distribution with shape parameter xi. For the
benchmark calibration I assume that η →∞. I calibrate the elasticity of substitution
ρ and ξ to match 1 − F (θ∗) = 0.7 and S
C
= 5. I set the parameters of disutility of
labor a and γ to match a fraction of hours worked of 0.2. The parameter for the
adjustment costs of capital, χ is set to target a relative volatility of investment to
3For the solution to the steady state see appendix F.
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GDP of 2.5. The rest of the parameters are chosen according to common values from
the literature, shown in Table 4.1
Table 4.1: Calibrated parameters
α β d δ
0.3 0.99 0.015 0.025
Figure 4.7 shows the responses of the inventories to sales ratio and inventory
investment to a shock to the aggregate demand shifter φt. The model generates a
countercyclical ratio and a response of inventory investment that is procyclical at
medium frequencies but countercyclical at high frequencies. This is consistent with
the data on inventory investment. The volatility of both variables is higher for lower
values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Table 4.2 compares moments of
the data with the model assuming an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.5.
The model does well except in two aspects. Consumption is more volatile than GDP
in the calibrated model and the volatility of inventory investment and the inventory
to sales ratio fall short when compared to the data.
Figure 4.7: Impulse-response to a demand shock
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The second calibration of the model has a value of η to match an inventory to
sales ratio of 3, consistent with the fall in the data. Table 4.3 compares some variable
moments between the benchmark calibration and the calibration with inventories to
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Table 4.2: Model fit with a demand shock driven cycle
Data Model
Variable SD/Y corr./y SD/Y corr./y
C 0.61 0.96 1.03 0.98
I 2.5 0.94 2.50 0.85
Is 22.1 0.43 8.76 0.24
S/C 0.83 -0.59 0.22 -0.83
sales ratio of S/C = 3. In the first two columns we can see that there is no important
change in the cyclicality of either inventory investment or capital investment, both
remain roughly as procyclical with the improvement in distribution technology. The
last column shows that the correlation between inventory investment and capital
investment falls with the improvement in distribution technology and it does so by
an amount comparable to what we see in the data. The correlation in the second
calibration is about a third of that in the benchmark, further, the relation goes from
positive to practically null. We can conclude that the change in the relation between
inventory and capital investment can in fact be explained by the same mechanism
as the fall in the inventories to sales ratio: improvement in distribution technology.
Given this result, I can now look at other effects of the improvement in distribution
technology on aggregate investment.
Table 4.3: Relative changes in volatility of business cycle aggregates
Model corrI/Y corrIs/Y corrIs/I
Benchmark 0.78 0.25 0.15
S/C = 3 0.83 0.16 0.06
Table 4.4 shows ratios of steady state values and volatilities of the second cal-
ibration divided by the benchmark4. As expected, we see in the first column that
the second calibration has a substantially smaller stock of final goods, at 44% of the
benchmark. This is explained by lower importance of inventories to deal with id-
4Values above 1 indicate a higher value in the second calibration. Values below one, higher values
in the benchmark
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iosyncratic uncertainty and can be seen reflected on the lower value of the parameter
θ∗.
The second column shows a decrease in the volatility of capital investment of about
12% while the volatility of other economic aggregates remains relatively unchanged.
This weakening volatility is one additional effect on aggregate capital investment
from the change in its relation with inventory investment. This is explained by firms
substituting future production with current production, done by increasing inventories
and reducing capital investment. This result shows the importance of looking at
inventory investment when studying the behavior of capital investment and opens
up the question of what other valuable information on economic aggregates can be
deduced from inventory data.
Table 4.4: Relative changes in volatility of business cycle aggregates
Variable Steady State Volatility
θ∗ 0.81 0.99
Y 1 1.01
C 0.86 1.01
C˜ 1.23 1.03
I 1 0.88
S 0.44 0.98
4.5 Conclusion
The behavior of final good inventories has changes in time starting in the 1980’s.
First, a reduction in the inventories to sales ratio that points towards improvement
in distribution technology. Second, a weakening correlation between inventory and
capital investment.
A theoretical framework in which inventories become less essential to produce sales
96
can explain both empirical facts. As inventories are less important to produce sales,
firms start holding them to smooth the cost of production. This causes inventory and
capital investment to turn form complements in production of sales to substitutes.
Through this mechanism, the volatility of aggregate capital investment after a demand
shock falls, as part of the response that would normally come from capital is now taken
by inventory investment. This result is promising in explaining at least partly the
recent changes in capital investment, particularly the underinvestment puzzle.
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APPENDIX A
Data
A.1 Aggregate data on shipments, new orders and
unfilled orders
Aggregate and industry data on shipments, orders and unfilled orders comes from the
publicly available historical series of the Census Bureau Manufacturers’ Shipments,
Inventories and Orders (M3) survey. The series have monthly frequency and are
availble under SIC and NAICS classification for the periods: SIC: 1959m1-2001m3
and NAICS:1992m1-2018m12. I splice the SIC and NAICS series for the category of
“Non-defense equipment and machinery excluding aircraft”. I exclude aircraft from
the analysis because this category has substantially higher unfilled orders and a much
more countercyclical ratio than the rest. This way I make sure that my results are not
driven by this category. To splice the series I apply growth rates from the SIC series
to the first observation of the NAICS series and construct the series back. I deflate
the series using the price index for Personal Consumption Expenditure Excluding
Food and Energy before splicing. Figure (A.1) compares the resulting spliced series
with the original SIC series. The period from 1992 to 2001 exists for both series and
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provides a test of how well the splicing works. For the three series, the spliced data
lies above the SIC data, but for the overlap period they seem to follow the same
behavior.
I aggregate the data to quarterly level. Shipments and new orders aggregate
additively as flows, unfilled orders are a stock, I aggregate them by averages. To
obtain cyclical components I run a Hodrick-Prescott filter on the natural logarithm
of the series. The smoothing parameter is 1600. For the series of the ratio of unfilled
orders to shipments, I take the HP-filter of the ratio in levels.
A.2 Firm level data from Compustat
Compustat dataset comes mainly from the fundamentals annual dataset. I keep
industrial reports (indfmt == ”INDL”) in standard format (datafmt == ”STD”)
from firms consolidated (consol == ”C”) in the U.S. (fic == ”USA”) and reporting
in dollars (curcd == ”USD”). I keep the subset of manufacturing firms according to
NAICS code 3.
To classify firms by type of capital they produce, I use the break-down from BEA
NIPA Table 5.5.5. Private Fixed Investment in Equipment by Type. I matched these
categories to NAICS codes using BEA’s file “PEQBridge2007Detail.xls” which con-
tains the bridge information to construct the mentioned table. I discuss the categories
below when I describe the comprehensive tax subsidy.
Variables in the dataset are GVKEY (Firm indicator), FYEAR (Year), year1 (first
year the firm appears in a dataset), year2 (last year the firm appears in a dataset),
OB (Order backlog), sale, invt (Total inventories), invfg (final good inventories),
invwip (work in process inventories), xint (interest and related expenses), lt (total
liabilitites), dlc (debt in current liabilities), dltt (long term debt), emp (employment)
and oiadp (operating income after depreciation). The dataset spans the period from
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Figure A.1: Spliced series for non-defense equipment escluding aircraft
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1974 to 2018.
I merge this dataset with the NBER CES productivity dataset and use its industry
specific deflators to convert Compustat variables to constant dollars of 2011. The
variables unfilled orders and shipments in my analysis correspond to ob and sale
respectively. The unfilled orders to shipments ratio is the ratio of these two. I drop
observations with missing values for shipments or unfilled orders and observations on
the first and 99th percentile of the ratio of unfilled orders to shipments. I estimate
the age of a firm by the difference between fyear and year1.
Controls: all empirical specifications have controls for: lagged log(at), age, lagged
log(emp) and a Lerner index computed as
Lerner =
oiadp
sale
.
The leverage ratio and financing costs are computed as
levt =
dlc+ dltt
at
rt =
xint
lt
I winsorize both variables at the first and 99th percentiles. Before using the
financial variables to sort firms into quartiles, I demean them at the firm level. With
this, the financial variables represent the deviation from the average position of the
firm.
The compustat dataset is matched to the comprehensive tax subsidy using NAICS
codes for the years between 1974 and 2009. I exclude the capital type “Aircraft” from
my analysis for the reasons listed above.
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A.3 Comprehensive tax subsidy
The data on the comprehensive tax subsidy was provided by Christopher House for
the categories of type of equipment listed in NIPA NIPA Table 5.5.5. I match this
to the Compustat dataset using NAICS codes. Categories by type of equipment are
shown in Table (A.1).
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Table A.1: Types of capital goods
1     Computers and peripheral equipment
2     Communication equipment
3       Electro-medical equipment
4       Medical instruments
5     Nonmedical instruments
6     Photocopy and related equipment
7     Office and accounting equipment
8     Fabricated metal products
9     Engines and turbines
10     Metalworking machinery
11     Special industry machinery, not elsewhere classified
12     General industrial, including materials handling, equipment
13     Electrical transmission, distribution, and industrial apparatus
14     Trucks, buses, and truck trailers
15     Autos
16     Ships and boats
17     Railroad equipment
18     Furniture and fixtures
19     Agricultural machinery
20     Construction machinery
21     Mining and oilfield machinery
22     Service industry machinery
23     Electrical equipment, not elsewhere classified
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APPENDIX B
Notes on the partial equilibrium models
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. I can write the delivery lag as UFOt
Shipt
− 1. As UFOt
Shipt
increases, the constraint
UFOt ≥ Shipt gets farther from binding. Now, I can express the shadow price µ as
µt =
∞∑
s=0
E[βspit+s]
This is, the shadow price of an unfilled order is the discounted sum of the expected val-
ues of the constraint binding. As UFOt
Shipt
increases, the constraint slacks more, bringing
the expected values of it binding in the future and the shadow price µ down.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Under convex new orders, the policy function Ship(UFO,P ) approaches the
convexity of new orders when close to the constraint. From Corollary 1 Ship(UFO,P )
approaches the concave function S(P ) as it pulls away from the constraint. Then, it
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must be that Ship(UFOP ) is less concave in prices than S(P ) which implies that
C(Ship(P ))Ship(P ) > 1
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APPENDIX C
Robustness of the empirical results
C.1 Investment Tax Credit
I show in Table (C.1) the estimated change in the unfilled orders to shipments ratio
after a 1% increase in the comprehensive tax subsidy (column 1) and the Investment
Tax Credit (column 2). The conclusions from Section 2.5 carry over when using
the ITC. Constraint firms respond to the tax incentives by actually increasing their
unfilled orders to shipments ratio while their unconstrained counterparts in all other
quartiles, reduce it.
C.2 Shadow of death
I show in Table (C.2) the specification using the leverage-ratio to sort firms into
quartiles. For this specification I exclude firm-year observations that correspond to
the last year a firm shows in the dataset. The order and conclusions from Section 2.5
carry over although the estimated coefficients are smaller and loose some statistical
significance.
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Table C.1: Estimated responses to a 1% change in tax incentives
ζ ITC
TC -0.050 0.017
(0.037) (0.112)
Q3TC -0.014 -0.052
(0.010) (0.016)
Q2TC -0.029 -0.063
(0.001) (0.017)
Q1TC -0.022 -0.039
(0.006) (0.017)
N 4283 4283
Table C.2: Estimated responses to a 1% change in tax incentives
log(Ship) log(UFO)
ζ 2.198 2.689
(1.662) (1.955)
Q3ζ 0.374 -0.0948
(0.230) (0.433)
Q2ζ 0.285 -0.607
(0.281) (0.419)
Q1ζ 0.393 -0.162
(0.134) (0.0706)
N 4184 4184
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APPENDIX D
Notes on the general equilibrium model
D.1 Equilibrium definition
An equilibrium in this economy, given the process for the productivity shock ϕt(ϕt−1, εt)
is given by
transition functions for
1. Aggregate state
Ψt = {UFO(Ψt−1, ϕt), K(Ψt−1, ϕt)}
2. Household state variables
ψhht =
{
ufo(ψhht−1,Ψt−1, ϕt)
}
3. Capital producer state variables
ψkpt =
{
ufokp(ψkpt−1,Ψt−1, ϕt), X(ψ
kp
t−1,Ψt−1, ϕt)
}
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policy functions for
1. Aggregate
Yt = {NO(Ψt−1, ϕt), Ship(Ψt−1, ϕt)}
2. Household
yHHt =
{
C(ψHHt−1 ,Ψt−1, ϕt), N(ψ
HH
t−1 ,Ψt−1, ϕt),
B(ψHHt−1 ,Ψt−1, ϕt), no
hh(ψHHt−1 ,Ψt−1, ϕt)
}
3. Capital goods producer
ykpt =
{
I(ψkpt−1,Ψt−1, ϕt),WC(ψ
kp
t−1,Ψt−1, ϕt), D(ψ
kp
t−1,Ψt−1, ϕt)
}
and prices {
P (Ψt−1, ϕt), P¯ (Ψt−1, ϕt), r(Ψt−1, ϕt)
}
such that
1. NOt = nohht = nokpt , UFOt = ufohht = ufokpt , Shipt = ℓtUFOt = θXt and
Bt = 0
2. Households maximize utility given states according to (2.26)
3. Capital goods producers maximize profits given states according to (??)
4. Households budget constraint (2.25) and laws of motion (2.24), (2.23) are sat-
isfied
5. Producers laws of motion (2.20) and (??) are satisfied
6. The aggregate resources constraint (2.27) and law of motion for aggregate un-
filled orders (2.13) are satisfied
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D.2 First order conditions
1. Law of motion UFO
UFOt = UFOt−1 − θXt−1 +NOt (D.1)
2. Law of motion aggregate capital
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + θXt (D.2)
3. Law of motion Work-in-process
Xt = (1− θ)Xt−1 + fracIγbγ (D.3)
4. Labor supply
ψN
1
η
t =
F2(Kt, Nt)
Ct
(D.4)
5. Euler equation capital
qt = βE
[
C−1t+1F1(Kt+1, Nt+!) + (1− δ)qt+1
]
(D.5)
6. Euler equation bonds
C−1t = (1 + rt)βE
[
C−1t+1
]
(D.6)
7. Euler equation UFO producer
pi1t = µt − βE
[
C−1t+1
C−1t
µt+1
]
+R1(UFOt, Dt) (D.7)
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8. Euler equation UFO household
Mt = ℓt(qt − (1− κ1)C−1t P¯t + (1− ℓt)βE[Mt+1] (D.8)
9. Euler equation Work in process
(1− κ1t)θP¯t − βE
[
θ
C−1t+1
C−1t
µt+1
]
= pi1t + λt − βE
[
θ
C−1t+1
C−1t
λt+1
]
(D.9)
10. Work-in-process demand
λt = (1 + κ2pi2t)bI
1−γ
t (D.10)
11. Orders supply
µt = ξ − κ1Pt(1 + pi2t) (D.11)
12. Orders demand
Mt = κ1PtC
−1
t (D.12)
13. Orders constraint
(UFOt −Xt)pi1t = 0 (D.13)
14. Aggregate resources constraint
Ct + It + ξNOt = F (Kt, Nt) (D.14)
15. Productivity process
Log(ϕt) = ρlog(varphit−1) + εt (D.15)
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16. Price process
P¯tUFOt = P¯t−1(UFOt−1 − θXt−1) + PtNOt (D.16)
17. Working capital constraint
WCt − κ2It)pi2t = 0 (D.17)
18. Debt constraint
pi3tDt = 0; (D.18)
19. Debt demand
pi3t + pi2t = R(UFOt, Dt) +R2(UFOt, Dt) (D.19)
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APPENDIX E
Auxiliary functions of the distribution of θ
f1(θ
∗) =
∫
θ<θ∗
θ
1
1−ρdF (θ)
f2(θ
∗, η, υ) =
θ∗∗∫
θ∗
θdF (θ)
f3(θ
∗, η, υ) =
∞∫
θ∗∗
θ
1
1−ρdF (θ)
With υt = Eκt+1κ and so θ∗∗ = 1+ηβ(1−d)
θ∗t
υt
. All economic aggregates can now be written
in terms of the functions
G(θ∗, υ, η) = f1(θ∗) + (θ∗)
ρ
1−ρf2(θ
∗, η, υ) +
(
β(1− d)
(1 + η)
υt
) ρ
1−ρ
f3(θ
∗, η, υ)
D(θ∗, υ, η) = f1(θ∗) + (θ∗)
1
1−ρ [F (θ∗∗)− F (θ∗)] +
(
β(1− d)
(1 + η)
υt
) 1
1−ρ
f3(θ
∗, η, υ)
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R(θ∗, υ, η) = F (θ∗) +
1
θ∗
f2(θ
∗, η, υ) +
1 + η
β(1− d)
1
υt
(1− F (θ∗∗))
H1(θ
∗) = (θ∗)
1
1−ρF (θ∗)− f1(θ∗)
H2(θ
∗, υt, ηt) =
(
β(1− d)
1 + η
υt
) 1
1−ρ
f3(θ
∗, η, υ)− (θ∗) 11−ρ [1− F (θ∗)]
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APPENDIX F
Model steady state
In steady state υ = 1 and with determined values for φ, A and η, all of the auxiliary
functions G,R,D,H1 and H2 are just functions of the steady state value of θ∗. From
E9 we have r = 1−β
β
. The value of θ∗ is determined by an equation that results from
combining E1 and E2
R(θ∗) =
1
β(1− d)
from E8
K
N
=
(
αA
r + δ
) 1
1−α
and given a steady state value of N = 1/3 this determines K as well. From equation
E10 consumption is determined
C =
(
1 + d
H1
D
+ η
H2
D
)−1 (
AKαN1−α − δK)
equations E3 and E4 determine C˜ and κ respectively
C˜ =
G
1
ρ
D
C
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κ = φC˜−σRG
1−ρ
ρ
Finally, S, X and T are determined as functions of C by equations E4, E5 and E6
respectively. The residual equation E7 yields a value for parameter a, consistent with
the desired steady state level of labor.
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